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MOONLIGHTING: THE PRIVATE 
EMPLOYMENT OF OFF-DUTY 
OFFICERS 
Seth W. Stoughton* 
Every day, law enforcement officers across the country don their 
uniforms, strap on their gun belts, and head to work. They carry the 
equipment and weapons they have been issued and bear the badges 
that symbolize their authority, but they are not all reporting to the 
government agency that employs them. Instead, many are “moon-
lighting.” From directing traffic at a busy church parking lot, to mak-
ing arrests at a packed nightclub, to using deadly force—uniformed 
off-duty officers exercise the full panoply of police powers while 
working for private employers. 
The private employment of off-duty officers blurs the line be-
tween private and public policing, raising questions about accounta-
bility, officer decision-making, police-community relationships, and 
the role that police agencies play in modern society. Thus far, howev-
er, the employment of off-duty officers by private companies has al-
most entirely evaded the attention of legal scholars. This Article is the 
first to provide an empirical assessment of moonlighting in the United 
States, reporting the results of an original survey of nonfederal law 
enforcement agencies that collectively employ over 143,000 full-time 
sworn officers, almost a fifth of all state and local officers in the coun-
try. A substantial majority of agencies—about 80%—allow officers to 
engage in moonlighting, and tens of thousands of officers at those 
agencies log millions of hours every year working for private employ-
ers. Yet governing law and agency policies reflect substantial varia-
tion in how off-duty employment is regulated. Moonlighting may be 
the norm, but as the multitudinous justifications for it, the many issues 
its raises, and the inconsistency in statutory and administrative re-
gimes suggest, there is a strong need for attention to this area. This 
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Article starts down that path by identifying stakeholders and consid-
erations necessary to the development of professional best practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 14, 2013, uniformed officers with the Eastern Pike Re-
gional Police Department were patrolling the construction site of a con-
troversial oil pipeline near the border between Pennsylvania, New York, 
and New Jersey. A civilian went to the construction site, took a series of 
pictures, and allegedly yelled obscenities at construction workers. One of 
the officers patrolling the construction site later wrote the individual a 
summons, charging him with trespassing and disorderly conduct.1 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Adam Federman, Kinder Morgan Paid Pennsylvania Police Department to ‘Deter Protests,’ 
EARTH ISLAND J. (May 21, 2015), http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/ 
kinder_morgan_paid_pennsylvania_police_department_to_deter_protests/. 
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On October 8, 2014, a uniformed officer with the Metropolitan Po-
lice Department was patrolling the Shaw neighborhood in central St. 
Louis, Missouri. He observed three men who fled shortly after seeing 
him; one of the men ran in a way that led the officer to believe that he 
was carrying a weapon. After a brief foot pursuit and a physical alterca-
tion, the suspect shot at the officer. The officer returned fire, killing the 
suspect.2 
In March 2015, a uniformed officer with the Texas Department of 
Public Safety agreed to pose for a photograph with Calvin Broadus, Jr. 
(best known under his stage name, Snoop Dog). When the picture was 
posted online, the officer was reprimanded for posing with someone 
known to have a criminal history and was formally instructed to refuse to 
pose for photographs in the future.3 
Arrests, the use of force, and administrative discipline are entirely 
unexceptional aspects of modern policing. In the three incidents de-
scribed above, however, there is an added wrinkle: the officers were not 
working for their primary employers at the time. The Eastern Pike Re-
gional Police officer patrolling the pipeline construction site was being 
paid by Kinder Morgan, a private energy infrastructure company.4 The 
uniformed Metropolitan Police officer patrolling the St. Louis neighbor-
hood was working for Hi-Tech Security, a private security company that 
provided the vehicle he was patrolling in at the time.5 The uniformed 
Texas Department of Public Safety officer was working for SXSW, Inc., 
which hosts the South-by-Southwest festival.6 
Every day, police officers7 across the country don their uniforms, 
strap on their gun belts, and head to work. They carry the equipment and 
weapons they have been issued. They wear the uniforms and badges that 
symbolize their authority. But they are not all reporting to the govern-
ment agency that employs them. Many officers will instead be using their 
authority, training, and equipment on behalf of a private employer, and 
they will spend many hours doing so. Indeed, some 300,000 state and lo-
cal officers may be putting in more than 43.45 million hours of moon-
                                                                                                                                      
 2. Fred Barbash & Abby Phillip, Fatal Shooting of 18-Year-Old by Off-Duty Police Officer Ig-
nites Protests in St. Louis, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/10/09/crowds-in-streets-of-st-louis-after-fatal-shooting-by-off-duty-police-officer/. 
 3. Christy Hoppe, DPS Trooper Required to Get Counseling for Posing with Snoop Dogg, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015, 4:29 PM), http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/04/dps-
trooper-required-to-get-counseling-for-posing-with-snoop-dogg.html/?hootPostID=e6e9b84abc86957 
c270df5491316107a. 
 4. Kinder Morgan had, according to a letter, contracted with the police department to provide 
uniformed officers in marked vehicles so as to “deter protests and prevent delays.” Letter from 
Dwayne Jones, Manager, Corp. Sec., Kinder Morgan, to Chad Stewart, Chief of Police, E. Pike Police 
Dep’t (May 1, 2013), http://earthisland.org/elist/assets/KM-EPRD.pdf. 
 5. See infra Part II. Note that this estimate is an extrapolation from a nonrepresentative sample, 
so it should not be considered statistically rigorous. 
 6. Hoppe, supra note 3. 
 7. I used the terms “police” and “police officer” to refer to law enforcement and law enforce-
ment officers generically. Although there can be both substantive and purely formal distinctions be-
tween police departments, sheriffs’ offices, and other agencies, as well as among the various agencies’ 
employees, those distinctions are not relevant in the context of this Article. 
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lighting work in any given year.8 From directing traffic at the exit of a 
busy church parking lot to providing security at a packed nightclub, uni-
formed police officers can, and do, exercise the full panoply of police 
powers while working in a private, off-duty capacity. Agencies typically 
take a favorable view of moonlighting, permitting, or even encouraging, 
officers to accept off-duty employment.9 Not only does it increase police 
visibility in the community, it also supplements agency staffing; off-duty 
officers will handle situations that would otherwise require an on-duty 
officer. Moonlighting benefits officers, who may be paid directly by the 
business that employs them, perhaps in cash and at an hourly rate that 
exceeds their normal pay.10 Officers may also receive in-kind remunera-
tion, such as free or reduced rent, or other collateral benefits, including 
employee discounts.11 But the benefits to agencies and officers are not 
without cost. The employment of off-duty officers by private entities 
raises serious concerns about democratic legitimacy, legal accountability, 
the potential effect on police practices, and the role that law enforcement 
agencies play in society. 
These concerns are at the core of current and long-standing discus-
sions about policing, but the private employment of public police has 
largely evaded the notice of legal scholars,12 sociologists,13 and police and 
security professionals.14 This lacuna is all the more surprising given the 
robust legal and sociological literature on “private policing” and “plural 
policing,” which explores how policing duties are often shared by public 
and private entities,15 and the smaller, if equally important, body of work 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH, MOONLIGHTING: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICIES 
GOVERNING PAID POLICE DETAILS 1 (2011), http://www.bgr.org/files/reports/BGR--Police_ 
Details.pdf. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Jason McGahan, Rent Breaks for Off-Duty Officers, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2001), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2001/02/15/rent-break-for-off-duty-officers/9782ebf3-4aa8-
4108-a038-7c78f1093d65/?utm_term=.7b9bba33d801. 
 12. David Sklansky offers a rare exception in a paragraph that describes the 150,000 police offic-
ers that were estimated to work as private security guards in 1990. David A. Sklansky, The Private Po-
lice, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1176 (1998). More recently, Elizabeth Joh raised concerns about the pri-
vate employment of public police in an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times, noting that the officer who 
shot and killed eighteen-year-old Vonderrit Myers, Jr. while patrolling a St. Louis neighborhood was 
working for a private security company at the time. Elizabeth E. Joh, When Police Moonlight in Their 
Uniforms, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014, 5:38 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-joh-
police-moonlighting-vonderrit-myers-20141014-story.html. 
 13. The late Albert J. Reiss, Jr. was an exception, authoring a study of private employment prac-
tices at thirteen different police agencies in the 1980s. ALBERT J. REISS, JR., PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 
OF PUBLIC POLICE (1988); see also Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Private Employment of Public Police, in 
WILLIAM T. GORMLEY JR., PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 226 (1991) (providing an over-
view that describes common practices and the competition between private security companies and 
public police officers working off-duty security details). 
 14. The lengthy second volume of the Hallcrest Report, which studied twenty-year trends in the 
private security industry and projected those trends for an additional ten years, included all of six pag-
es about the employment of off-duty officers by private security firms, relying both on original surveys 
and on Reiss’s work. WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE HALLCREST REPORT II: PRIVATE 
SECURITY TRENDS, 1970–2000, at 289–95 (1990). 
 15. Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn, The United Kingdom, in PLURAL POLICING: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 34 (2006); LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY 
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on the interplay of officer self-interest and policing practices.16 The pri-
vate employment of public police is an important and relevant considera-
tion that has, thus far, gone largely overlooked. This Article begins to 
correct that oversight by describing the results of original survey research 
of three years of off-duty employment practices at state and local law en-
forcement agencies across the country—with responses received from 
more than 160 agencies that collectively employ more than 143,000 full-
time sworn officers—by exploring the legal and administrative regula-
tions that govern the practice, and by identifying the concerns raised by 
off-duty employment. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes private, off-
duty employment in more detail. I first provide a more complete defini-
tion of “private, off-duty employment,” then present the results of an 
original survey sent to almost 400 state, city, and county police agencies 
across the country. The 162 responding agencies17 employ a collective to-
tal of 143,927 full-time, sworn employees, representing almost a fifth of 
all state and local officers at general-service law enforcement agencies in 
the United States.18 The survey queried agencies on whether they al-
lowed officers to work in a law-enforcement capacity for private employ-
ers, their justifications for permitting or prohibiting the practice, and 
about the regulations they have adopted to govern off-duty employment. 
Agencies that indicated they had a written policy governing private, off-
duty employment were later asked to provide a copy of that policy. Ap-
proximately 80% of responding agencies, employing a collective total of 
more than 123,600 full-time, sworn officers, authorize off-duty employ-
ment, although their reasons for doing so vary. The remaining roughly 
20% of responding agencies, which collectively employ over 20,000 full-
time sworn officers, prohibit off-duty employment, again for a variety of 
reasons. Agencies also provided data on the number of officers who were 
approved to or who actually worked for private employers, the total 
number of hours worked, and the number of moonlighting requests that 
the agency declined, although fewer than half of the agencies tracked the 
relevant information. 
                                                                                                                                      
POLICING (2005); Sean James Beaton, Counterparts in Modern Policing: The Influence of Corporate 
Investigators on the Public Police and a Call for the Broadening of the State Action Doctrine, 26 TOURO 
L. REV. 593 (2010); Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 5736 
(2005); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 357 (2006); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 49 
(2004); Hayden P. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Joint Policing: Third Parties and the Use of Force, 12 
POLICE PRAC. & RES. 136 (2011); Cooper J. Strickland, Regulation Without Agency: A Practical Re-
sponse to Private Policing in United States v. Day, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1338 (2011). 
 16. See, e.g., EDITH LINN, ARREST DECISIONS: WHAT WORKS FOR THE OFFICER? (2009). 
 17. The 40% response rate is generally consistent with prior survey research of police agencies. 
 18. The almost 144,000 full-time, sworn officers employed by the 162 responsive agencies make 
up 19.86% of the approximately 724,600 full-time, sworn personnel employed by general service state 
and local police agencies in the United States as of 2013. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 2 (2015), http://www. 
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf [hereinafter REAVES, POLICE DEPARTMENTS]. 
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Part III examines the state statutes and agency policies that govern 
moonlighting. A fifty-state survey identified thirty-four states and the 
District of Columbia that have no laws authorizing or governing the pri-
vate employment of off-duty officers, although officers are likely regulat-
ed by more generic statutes regulating government officials’ outside em-
ployment. The remaining sixteen states either explicitly authorize 
moonlighting (ten) or do so implicitly (six) through statutes that regulate 
the practice even though no statute specifically permits it. State statutes 
that regulate moonlighting do so by establishing procedural or substan-
tive regulations or by delegating to political subdivisions the authority to 
craft such regulations. Other statutes regulate moonlighting by situating 
it within a broader legal context by allocating liability for off-duty offic-
ers’ actions or by distinguishing between off-duty officers and private se-
curity personnel. Despite these thematic similarities, there are substantial 
differences in whether and how state laws regulate moonlighting. 
Agency policies show even more variation. The survey asked agen-
cies whether they had written policies, procedures, directives, or guide-
lines for the private employment of off-duty officers and, if so, whether 
they would provide their policies if requested. Although the vast majori-
ty of agencies indicated that they had a written policy (153) and would be 
willing to share it (117), only thirty-eight of the agencies that permit 
moonlighting (29.2%) did so when requested. I reviewed the provided 
policies and other documents19 with a specific eye to identifying require-
ments for and restrictions on moonlighting; the administration of private, 
off-duty jobs; the use of police uniforms, equipment, and vehicles while 
off-duty; and officer remuneration. 
Part IV explores the practical, legal, and conceptual concerns raised 
by the private employment of off-duty officers. Practically, moonlighting 
may affect officers’ decisions and actions, changing their behavior while 
both on and off duty. Legally, the private employment of off-duty offic-
ers raises questions about the applicability of both civil liability—for of-
ficers, police agencies, and private employers—and criminal liability for 
the individuals who interact with off-duty officers. Conceptually, moon-
lighting raises questions about the nature of law enforcement agencies 
and the roles they play in the communities they serve. This Article does 
not attempt to answer those questions. Instead, my goal is to set the stage 
for a much-needed body of work to engage with the normative and pre-
scriptive implications of moonlighting. 
I conclude by outlining areas for future research and calling for the 
development of best practices to regulate the private employment of off-
duty officers. 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. For example, some agencies provided copies of the off-duty employment contracts that pri-
vate employers enter into or similar documentation. 
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II. PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT 
In this Part, I define the widespread practice of “moonlighting”—
officers working in a law enforcement capacity for private employers 
while off-duty. This Part describes off-duty employment practices by re-
lying on an original survey that gathered information from 162 state and 
local law enforcement agencies around the country that collectively em-
ploy more than 143,000 full-time, sworn officers, almost 20% of all state 
and local police officers in the country. 
Before turning to the results of my research, it is worth identifying 
how little we know about contemporary moonlighting. There has never 
been a great deal of information about moonlighting, and the limited 
analysis that exists reflects a very different time and social context. It is 
an understatement to say that the practice has not been the subject of 
sustained academic attention; indeed, it has been almost entirely over-
looked since the mid-1980s, when Yale sociologist Albert J. Reiss, Jr.20 
examined the practices of thirteen agencies, ranging in size from 288 to 
1,829 officers.21 To the extent that moonlighting has been the subject of 
study since, it is almost entirely encapsulated in the broader study of the 
private security industry. In the late 1980s, the National Institute of Jus-
tice, for example, surveyed police executives, corporate security execu-
tives, and contract security executives about the private security industry, 
including in that topic a brief exploration of moonlighting.22 According to 
that study, 81% of police executives indicated that officers were permit-
ted to work in a private security capacity, with the remaining 19% pro-
hibiting or severely restricting the practice.23 The police executives esti-
mated that about 20% of their officers had “regular outside security 
employment,” leading researchers to estimate at the time that “at least 
150,000 local law-enforcement officers in the U.S. are regularly engaged 
in off-duty employment in private security.”24 The researchers further es-
timated, based on several field studies, that if the officers were each 
working fifteen hours per week and getting paid fifteen dollars per 
hour—which the study identified as “the low end of the off-duty pay 
range”—the total annual earnings of police for off-duty employment 
would be about $1.8 billion, or roughly equal to the combined total reve-
nue of the four largest security companies in the country in 1988.25 The 
                                                                                                                                      
 20. Among policing scholars, Reiss is perhaps best known for his ground-breaking observational 
studies of officer activity, including police violence and officer misconduct.  
 21. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 22. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 289–95. The section that discusses the private em-
ployment of off-duty officers makes up six pages of the 326-page report, excluding the bibliography. 
This second Hallcrest Report built on an earlier report, released in 1985. WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM & 
TODD H. TAYLOR, THE HALLCREST REPORT: PRIVATE SECURITY & POLICE IN AMERICA 283–87 
(1985). 
 23. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 290. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 295. 
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brief section of the report that discussed moonlighting observed that “the 
practice [was] growing.”26 
A. Defining Private, Off-Duty Employment 
In this Article,27 I use the terms “moonlighting” and “private, off-
duty employment” to refer to public police officers working in a law en-
forcement capacity for private employers outside of their normal work-
ing hours in exchange for some financial benefit derived from that pri-
vate entity. For example, uniformed officers may be paid for providing 
security at a nightclub or bar or for directing traffic outside of a church or 
synagogue.28 Officers may also receive free or discounted rent at an 
apartment complex (so-called “courtesy officers”) in exchange for park-
ing their marked police vehicle in a visible spot or for responding, when 
off-duty, to non-emergency calls like noise complaints.29 Officers may be 
compensated directly by the private entity that hires them, or the em-
ployer may pay the city or agency so the officer’s compensation is chan-
neled through the public payroll system.30 Officers may also receive col-
lateral benefits from private employers, such as employee discounts and 
earlier-than-public access to information and products.31 
For purposes of this project, “private, off-duty employment” specif-
ically excludes officers who have outside jobs unrelated to law enforce-
ment. An officer who owns a landscaping business, works as an insurance 
adjustor, or does freelance photography is not engaged in private, off-
duty employment as I use that term. The term also excludes officers who 
work, while off duty, in a law enforcement capacity when their compen-
sation derives from a governmental entity rather than a private entity. 
Thus, officers who work overtime, in uniform and on their day off, at 
road construction sites or at collegiate sports events are not engaged in 
private, off-duty employment, even if the Department of Roads or the 
                                                                                                                                      
 26. Id.  
 27. I include this disclaimer because there is no universally accepted industry language that re-
fers to the concept I label “private, off-duty employment.” Law enforcement agencies and organiza-
tions use a variety of terms—such as “off-duty employment,” “secondary employment,” “special de-
tails,” “extra duty,” and so on—that may or may not, depending on the individual agency, refer to 
what I describe as “private, off-duty employment.” 
 28. See Jon Vanderlaan, Texas City Bans Off-Duty Cops from Working Bars, POLICEONE (Aug. 
24, 2016), https://www.policeone.com/financial-planning/articles/213471006-Texas-city-bans-off-duty-
cops-from-woring-bars/. 
 29. LAWRENCE J. FENNELLY, HANDBOOK OF LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION 459 
(2012). 
 30. Kristyn Martin et al., Cops for Hire, AL JAZEERA AM. (Apr. 27, 2015, 2:23 PM), http:// 
america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/real-money-with-alivelshi/articles/2015/4/27/pay-money-and-hire-
off-duty-cops.html. 
 31. See Desiree Stennett, OPD Officers Paid Well Above Normal Pay to Work ‘Extra Duty’  
Security Details at Local Businesses, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 15, 2015, 5:53 PM), http://www. 
orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-orlando-police-off-duty-work-20150715-story.html. 
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public university hosting the sporting event reimburses the agency or 
pays the officers directly.32 
Many individuals employed in public service may perform work for 
private parties, but the employment of off-duty police officers is unique. 
Other officials—traffic engineers, building inspectors, and law professors, 
for example—are privately employed because of their knowledge or 
skills. To the extent that their public position is valuable to the private 
employer, it is because of the symbolic importance of their public posi-
tion, not because they will be exercising their public powers on behalf of 
their private employer. Consider the example of a law professor working 
for a state school: the professor may be engaged as a consultant to advise 
on litigation strategy, retained to offer an expert opinion, or hired as a 
lecturer by a test preparation company. In each case, the private employ-
er benefits from the very attributes that qualify the professor for her pub-
lic position—her knowledge of the law, her subject-matter expertise, and 
her ability to teach effectively. Her public position is important because 
it is a strong signal—both to the private employer and to the audience 
the private employer wants to impress—of the professor’s qualifications. 
In other words, litigation advice, an expert opinion, or exam preparation 
information may be perceived as more authoritative because it is provid-
ed by a professor. But the value, while very real, is purely symbolic. The 
fact that the professor works at a public school does not qualify her to of-
fer opinions or take actions that would be beyond the ken of a similarly 
situated consultant, expert, or instructor who works for a private univer-
sity or outside of higher education altogether. In other words, the profes-
sor’s position does not in and of itself instill her with additional 
knowledge, skills, or abilities, and the professor is certainly not hired to 
exercise her authority as a professor. As with the traffic engineer or 
building inspector, being hired by a private employer to use her public 
authority—to include or exclude information in a particular course or to 
grade exams a certain way, for example—would raise at least the appear-
ance of impropriety. In short, the professor’s public position may bolster 
her appeal and gravitas, but it does not itself allow her to say or do any-
thing that she could not say or do in the absence of public employment. 
That is decidedly not the case for the privately employed, off-duty 
police officer. Like the professor, officers will use the training and skills 
that qualify them for their public positions. But, unlike the professor, the 
officer can use her public authority on behalf of her private employer. 
Indeed, the officer’s greater capacity to detain, search, arrest, and use 
force—which may be predicated on a higher quantum of proof than a 
private security guard can act upon, but is not tied to a limited set of of-
fenses like merchant’s privilege or an employer’s property33—is a large 
                                                                                                                                      
 32. An officer would be engaged in private, off-duty employment for working a sporting event if 
their pay originated from a private entity such as a sports franchise, stadium ownership or manage-
ment, or a booster organization. 
 33. Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred Blue Line: Reform in an Era of Public & Private Policing, 
___ AM. CRIM. L. REV. ___, 16-25 (forthcoming 2017). 
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part of the reason that private employers hire off-duty officers rather 
than armed security guards.34 As with the examples at the beginning of 
this Article, the actions that off-duty officers take while working for pri-
vate employers can be indistinguishable from the actions that an on-duty 
officer might take. In contrast with other public officials who may also 
work for private employers, a public police officer is hired primarily be-
cause of her ability to take the same types of action on behalf of her pri-
vate employer that she can take on behalf of the public: detaining, 
searching, and arresting, for example. Where the professor’s title symbol-
izes her expertise and gravitas, an officer’s title and uniform symbolize 
her legal authority. 
To further demonstrate the contrast between police officers and 
other public sector workers, consider the private employment prospects 
of retired public officials. A retired law professor retains her gravitas and 
expertise and can thus expect to remain attractive as a consultant, expert, 
or lecturer long after leaving her professorship. A retired police officer, 
on the other hand, is no longer vested with public authority. While she 
might hope to be hired as a consultant or expert based on the knowledge, 
skills, and experiences she developed as an officer, she will never again 
be hired to provide law enforcement services to a private employer. 
B. Survey Results 
To obtain information about contemporary moonlighting, I sent 
surveys to almost 400 state and local (city and county) police agencies 
representing forty-two states and the District of Columbia.35 Agencies 
were selected for inclusion in a nonprobabilistic sample based in part on 
the availability of contact information, with a conscious preference for 
larger agencies and those representing a variety of geographic locations.36 
The mailings were addressed to the head of the agency—e.g., sheriff or 
police chief—and included a two-page letter that defined private, off-
duty employment37 and a three-page survey about the agency’s private, 
off-duty employment practices. The surveys could be returned in hard 
copy (by use of a stamped, self-addressed envelope included in the mail-
ing) or scanned and returned via e-mail. The letter also explained that 
respondents could complete an electronic version of the survey on 
Google Forms—which used identical language and was formatted to re-
                                                                                                                                      
 34. Phoenix-based security firm Law Enforcement Specialists, which specializes in placing off-
duty police officers with private employers, lists the comparative benefits of hiring off-duty officers 
over “ordinary security guards” on its website, focusing not just on the officers’ greater training and 
weaponry, but also on their legal authority, their ability to take action—including the use of deadly 
force, when warranted—immediately and decisively. See Why Choose Off Duty Law Enforcement 
Over Security Guards?, LAW ENF’T SPECIALISTS, http://offdutypoliceofficers.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 
2017). 
 35. Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Utah were 
not included. Their exclusion was unintentional, not deliberate. 
 36. The preference for larger agencies was based on the hypothesis that such agencies would be 
more likely to track the data requested by the survey. 
 37. See supra Section II.A. 
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semble the hard-copy survey as much as possible—in lieu of filling out 
the hard-copy survey. The original survey requests were mailed out in 
February 2015. Agencies that did not respond by May 2015 were con-
tacted and asked to complete and return the survey. The surveys solicited 
information about the agencies, about the legal and administrative regu-
lation of private, off-duty employment, and about the private, off-duty 
employment practices at the agencies. A copy of the survey as it was 
mailed out in hard copy appears in Appendix A.38 A copy of the electron-
ic version of the survey can be accessed online.39 
A total of 162 state and local police agencies responded to the sur-
vey.40 The responding agencies collectively employ 143,927 full-time, 
sworn officers, or just under 20% of the more than 720,000 state and lo-
cal officers in the United States.41 Chart 1 details the responsive agencies 
and the number of full-time, sworn officers they employ, categorizing 
agencies into seven size ranges that are generally consistent with the cat-
egories used by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.42 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 38. See infra App. A. 
 39. Seth W. Stoughton, Private, Off-Duty Employment Research Form (2015), https://docs. 
google.com/forms/d/1t0Fkqzn2GgnANheVurESe1cLGuD6U2kv9BYQBzYS748/viewform?fbzx=6067
124011061185137. 
 40. Chart 1 provides a breakdown of the responding agencies by agency size, relying on the self-
reported number of full-time, sworn employees and organized into the categories used by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics. See infra App. A. Fifty-four agencies completed the electronic version of the sur-
vey, and 101 filled out the hardcopy of the survey. In reporting the results of the survey, I do not fur-
ther distinguish between agencies that returned a hand-written survey and those that filled out the 
electronic version of the survey. 
 41. REAVES, POLICE DEPARTMENTS, supra note 18, at 2. 
 42. The relevant categories include agencies that employ over 1,000 officers, 500 to 999 officers, 
250–499 officers, 100–249 officers, 50–99 officers, 25–49 officers, and 1–24 officers. The Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics separates the smallest of the categories used in this project (1–24 officers) into four cate-
gories: agencies that employ 10–24 officers, 5–9 officers, 2–4 officers, and only a single officer. Id. at 3. 
These categories were combined into the 1–24 officers for administrative convenience. Of the eleven 
responding agencies that employed 1–24 full-time officers, seven had from 10–24 officers, two had 
from 5–9 officers, and two had 2–4 officers. 
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CHART 1: RESPONSIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES & NUMBER OF 
SWORN OFFICERS 
  
Agency Size by Number of Full-Time, Sworn Employees 
All >1000 999-500 499-250 249-100 99-50 49-25 <25 
Total  
Agencies 








1,017 276 296 180 64 46 113 42 
 
Of the 162 responding agencies, 130 agencies (80.25%) permit at 
least some form of private, off-duty employment.43 The remaining 32 
(19.75%) prohibit officers from working in a law enforcement capacity 
for private employers while off duty.44 This finding is consistent with find-
ings from research conducted in the 1980s.45 A majority of agencies in 
each size category permitted at least some form of private, off-duty em-
ployment, ranging from a high of 95.83% (23 out of 24) of the agencies 
that employed 500–999 full-time officers to a low of 65.21% (15 out of 
23) of the agencies that employed 250–499 full-time officers. Chart 2 pro-
vides a breakdown of permissive and prohibitive agencies. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 43. This is very similar to the information obtained by the Hallcrest study of the private security 
industry. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 44. Several agencies that checked the box indicating that they did not permit private, off-duty 
employment clarified, in their free-form responses, that they do permit some form, often a restricted 
form, of private, off-duty employment. For example, one agency indicated that it did not permit pri-
vate, off-duty employment, but then explained:  
We do allow Officers to work for private organizations directing traffic in uniform outside of their 
40-hour work week. These outside details may or may not be for a government agency. That be-
ing said, all details are arranged through the police department. Money from the agency that hires 
the Officer goes to the PD and then the PD pays the Officer. Those details include sporting 
events, proms, traffic details for the City or for utility companies, as well as many more. We do 
not allow Officers to work jobs that are not scheduled through our PD. 
Survey Response by Northampton Police Department, submitted electronically on March 27, 2015. 
For the statistics reported in this article, I have categorized such responses as permitting private, off-
duty employment. 
 45. See supra notes 13–14, 22–26, and accompanying text. 
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CHART 2: AGENCIES THAT PERMIT OR PROHIBIT PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
Agencies were asked to briefly explain why they permitted or pro-
hibited private, off-duty employment and were given a space on the sur-
vey form to provide free-form answers that could include multiple justifi-
cations from a single agency. Before reporting the results, it is important 
to acknowledge the limitations of the responses: the answers, after all, 
were provided by individual employees who may not have been privy to 
or involved in the decision to permit or prohibit moonlighting. Although 
it would be a mistake to take the accuracy and authority of any particular 
response for granted, the collective responses provide general insights 
into the considerations that may motivate policy decisions in this area. 
This may be particularly true when the same justifications are provided 
by multiple agencies. Among the thirty-two agencies that prohibit the 
practice (“prohibitive agencies”), three justifications were repeated in 
multiple answers: concerns about liability, conflicts of interest, and gov-
erning laws or codes. Additionally, eight justifications were offered by 
individual agencies but not reported by multiple agencies.46 Ten agencies 
either provided no response or provided a nonresponsive answer. Chart 
3 provides a breakdown of the justifications for prohibiting moonlight-
ing.47 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 46. Those individual reasons include: “[Officers] are trained w/public dollars not to be used for 
private entity”; “workman’s comp”; “affecting on duty status”; “prohibited by union contract”; “it 
would not be fair [for businesses to get police services because they can pay for them while other busi-
nesses do not because they cannot pay for them]”; “[i]t is not a commonly accepted practice in Alaska 
[the state in which the agency is located]”; and the availability of overtime through the department. 
 47. Note that column totals may be greater than 100% because agencies were permitted to pro-
vide more than one justification. 
STOUGHTON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2017 10:37 AM 
1860 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
CHART 3: AGENCIES PROHIBITING PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY  
EMPLOYMENT – JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
Among the 130 agencies that permit officers to work for private 
employers while off duty (“permissive agencies”), seven justifications 
were repeated by multiple agencies: 
1.   Forty agencies identified benefits to community relations; 
2.  Thirty-six agencies identified benefits to officers, either financial 
benefits (thirty-two) or unspecified benefits (four); 
3.   Thirty-three agencies identified benefits to agency staffing; 
4.  Twenty-five agencies cited some authority that allowed or re-
quired the agency to permit moonlighting, including collective 
bargaining agreements (five), agency policy or practice (six),48 or 
state law (four); 
5.  Eighteen agencies identified the increased presence or visibility of 
police in the community; 
6.   Eleven agencies identified benefits to public safety; and 
7.   Four agencies cited public demand. 
Individual agencies also provided four additional justifications, none of 
which were reported by more than a single agency.49 Note that a single 
agency could provide multiple justifications, all of which were counted 
                                                                                                                                      
 48. There is, of course, a tautological issue with the six agencies that justified permitting private, 
off-duty employment by stating that the practice is allowed by agency policy. I include those justifica-
tions in an effort to report survey results comprehensively and accurately, although that answer is ar-
guably not responsive to the question asked. 
 49. Those individual reasons include: “Officers are only allowed to work off-duty when there is a 
direct benefit to the University”; “[g]ood for . . . officer engagement”; “[t]o reduce calls for service 
saving tax payer fees for service”; and “improve enforcement and coordination between private securi-
ty and department.” 
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separately—thus, twenty-nine of the thirty-four agencies with over 1,000 
full-time, sworn officers provided a total of fifty-one justifications, while 
the remaining five either did not respond to that survey question or pro-
vided a nonresponsive answer. Twenty-seven agencies provided either no 
response or an entirely nonresponsive answer. A breakdown of the justi-
fications for prohibiting private, off-duty employment is found in Chart 
4. 
CHART 4: AGENCIES PERMITTING PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY  
EMPLOYMENT–JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
The 130 permissive agencies were asked to provide information 
about private, off-duty employment for 2012, 2013, and 2014, including 
the number of sworn officers who were approved to work for private 
employers, the number of sworn officers who actually worked for private 
employers, and the total number of hours sworn officers worked for pri-
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vate employers. For each question, more than half of the responding 
agencies either reported that they do not track the relevant information 
or they did not provide any information: 30.76% of agencies tracked the 
number of officers approved to work for private employers, 46.15% 
tracked the number of officers who actually worked for private employ-
ers, and 23.84% tracked the number of hours that officers worked for 
private employers. In each case, agencies that had at least 1,000 officers 
were more likely to track the requested information than most of the 
smaller categories. A breakdown of the responses can be found in Charts 
5, 6, and 7.50 Additionally, although this is not reflected on the charts, 
more agencies reported tracking data in 2014 than in 2012.  




                                                                                                                                      
 50. Note that responses of “0” were treated as responsive. 
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CHART 6: NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WORKED FOR PRIVATE 
EMPLOYERS, 2012-2014 
 
CHART 7: NUMBER OF HOURS OFFICERS WORKED FOR PRIVATE 
EMPLOYERS, 2012-2014 
 
Further, among agencies that permit officers to engage in moon-
lighting, refusing to allow it in a particular instance is relatively rare. 
Chart 8 provides data from the 29.23% of agencies that track decisions to 
refuse private, off-duty employment requests. 
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CHART 8: NUMBER OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT REQUESTED DECLINED, 
2012-2014 
 
Although fewer than half of the responding agencies reported track-
ing private, off-duty employment practices, the information provided by 
the minority of agencies that do provides some sense of the scope of the 
practice. Far more officers across the country may be working for private 
employers than is commonly assumed. The sixty agencies that provided 
tracked data indicated that 35,514 of their total 83,316 full-time, sworn 
employees, or 42.63%, actually worked in a private, off-duty capacity in 
2014.51 This was not intended to be a representational survey, and it 
would be difficult to generate reliable numbers given the relative infre-
quency with which agencies track the data, but an estimate based on that 
figure suggests that more than 300,000 state and local officers may be en-
gaged in moonlighting in a given year. Further, they may be doing so 
more frequently than previously thought. The twenty-eight agencies that 
tracked the number of hours that officers worked for private employers 
reported an average of 3.7 million hours from 2012 to 2014, and those 
agencies employed an average of 61,486 officers in that time.52 Applying 
that ratio to the roughly 725,000 state and local officers at general-
purpose agencies in the United States, officers may spend 43,636,763 
hours working for private employers in a given year, the equivalent of 
over 20,900 full-time positions.53 These rough estimates—which, again, 
should not be taken as statistically rigorous—certainly suggest the need 
for better information about moonlighting; its regulation; and the practi-
cal, legal, and conceptual questions that it raises. 
                                                                                                                                      
 51. Comparing this figure to the number of officers who were approved to work for private em-
ployers in 2014—23,178 out of 62,312—is misleading, as the agencies that provided information about 
the number of approvals were not necessarily those that provided data about the number of hours ac-
tually worked, and vice versa. 
 52. The 61,486 average includes officers who did not work for private employers at all. The sur-
vey instrument and responses were not fine-grained enough to exclude the officers at responsive agen-
cies who did not work for private employers. 
 53. This figure was reached by applying the 2,087-hour work year described in federal law.  
5 U.S.C. § 5504(b) (2012) (identifying how to calculate hourly pay). 
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III. REGULATING PRIVATE, OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT 
Potentially hundreds of thousands of officers work millions of hours 
for private employers every year, yet the rules that govern moonlighting 
vary tremendously from state to state and agency to agency. In this Part, 
I examine the statutory and agency-level regulations that govern the pri-
vate employment of off-duty officers. As a threshold matter, the Consti-
tution itself is silent on the practice of moonlighting, although off-duty 
officers who work for private employers raise a host of questions that 
implicate constitutional concerns. Those questions and concerns are dis-
cussed in Part IV. Further, I did not attempt to study the regulation of 
moonlighting through city or county ordinances. This Part explores the 
scope and variety of existing legal and administrative regulations, setting 
the stage for an informed discussion of the concerns raised by moonlight-
ing and best practices for addressing those concerns. 
A. Statutory Regulation 
Both policing and private security are regulated by state law, but 
there are few statutes dealing explicitly with the private employment of 
off-duty officers and fewer yet that provide more than a blanket authori-
zation of the practice. An examination of all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia revealed that statutory regulation falls into one of three cat-
egories; states that do not prohibit moonlighting, but are otherwise silent 
on the issue; states that explicitly authorize moonlighting, but do not 
regulate it; and states that permit and regulate moonlighting. No state 
categorically prohibits police moonlighting.  
1. Statutory Silence 
For thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, I was unable to 
find any statutory law directed specifically at the private employment of 
off-duty officers.54 These states may, of course, have generalized statutes 
that, for example, prohibit private employment when it would impair a 
public official in the exercise of their public duties.55 Such statutes may 
include police officers under their broad provisions, which tacitly ap-
prove of public officials working for private employers when there is no 
                                                                                                                                      
 54. States for which I have not identified any specific statutes include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5806 (West 2016); D.C. CODE § 1-618.02; FLA. STAT. 
§ 112.313 (2016); LA. REV. STAT. § 42:1111 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.342(6) (2016); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-6-3 (2016). New York leaves it to the governing body of local political subdivisions to de-
velop standards governing, inter alia, “private employment in conflict with official duties, future em-
ployment, and such other standards relating to the conduct of officers and employees as may be 
deemed advisable.” N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 806 (McKinney 2016).  
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conflict of interest, but they say nothing specific about moonlighting it-
self.56 
In these states, the ability of off-duty officers to work for private 
employers is often assumed under the rationale that what is not prohibit-
ed is permitted, particularly in light of historical precedent. An opinion 
letter by the Texas Attorney General provides an example of such logic, 
describing the lack of explicit authorization for moonlighting, but noting 
“that the practice of permitting outside employment is a long-standing 
one, having been recognized by many opinions and decisions of this of-
fice, as well as by various Texas courts, and the legislature has never tak-
en any action to prohibit the practice.”57 
2. Statutory Authorization 
Other states have statutes that authorize, in some fashion, the pri-
vate employment of off-duty officers. The authorization can be some-
what backhanded, coming in the form of an exception to a more general 
rule that otherwise prohibits government employees from taking outside 
employment, especially private employment that involves the use of pub-
lic authority or equipment. California, for example, prohibits executive 
employees from receiving any “emolument, gratuity, or reward,” for offi-
cial acts,58 a prohibition that was read by the state Supreme Court to pre-
clude the private employment of off-duty officers.59 The legislature 
amended the statute, creating a specific exemption to avoid precluding 
officers from providing security60 and other services61 on behalf of private 
employers. In its current iteration, the statute includes a series of limita-
tions on the ability of local public employees to work for private employ-
ers,62 but a different provision of California law makes clear that those 
limitations are not a prohibition against moonlighting: “It is not the in-
tent of [the Government Code] to prevent the employment by private 
business of a public employee, such as a peace officer, . . . who is off duty 
to do work related to and compatible with his regular employment.”63 
Iowa, similarly, exempts police officers from a general prohibition that 
otherwise forbids public employees from engaging in outside employ-
ment 
                                                                                                                                      
 56. This is not to suggest that such laws have no effect on police practices. For a more thorough 
discussion, see Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179 (2014) 
(describing laws that, while not aimed specifically at policing, still exert a significant effect on police 
practices). 
 57. See Tex. Atty. Gen. Op., No. GA-0256, 2004 WL 2231869, at *3 (Oct. 4, 2004). Texas law 
explicitly provides for some officers to accept private employment. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§§ 411.0077–.0078 (West 2016). 
 58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(a) (West 2016). 
 59. Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal. 1979), superseded by statute, CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 243; People v. Corey 581 P.2d 644, 639 (Cal. 1978), superseded by statute, Cal. Penal 
Code § 243, as recognized in Melendez v. City of L.A., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469 (1998). 
 60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(c)(1). 
 61. Id. § 70(e). 
 62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1126(a) (West 2016). 
 63. Id. § 1127. 
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that involves the use of [public] time, facilities, equipment, and sup-
plies or the use of [a public] badge, uniform, business card, or other 
evidences of office or employment to give the person . . . an ad-
vantage or pecuniary benefit that is not available to other similarly 
situated members of . . . the public.64 
Some states go beyond not prohibiting the practice by explicitly authoriz-
ing it. Kentucky law, for example, allows officers “while in office, and 
during hours other than regular or scheduled duty hours” to provide se-
curity services as well as engage in “any other similar or private employ-
ment.”65 A Washington statute provides clear authorization for state pa-
trol officers, establishing that they “may engage in private law 
enforcement off-duty employment, in uniform or in plainclothes for pri-
vate benefit.”66 
It is possible for authorization to be both explicit and tepid: Virginia 
allows private, off-duty employment, but it does so by delegating the de-
cision to authorize private, off-duty employment to the political subdivi-
sion in which an officer works.67 
3. Statutory Regulation 
In addition to authorizing the private employment of off-duty offic-
ers, several states have adopted statutes that regulate the practice in 
some way. Some statutes directly govern the practice of moonlighting it-
self by establishing procedural or substantive regulations or by delegat-
ing to political subdivisions the authority to craft such regulations. Other 
statutes regulate moonlighting by situating it within a legal framework, 
by allocating liability for off-duty officers’ actions, or by distinguishing 
between off-duty officers and private security personnel. 
a. Direct Regulation 
The direct regulation of moonlighting comes in the form of statutes 
that set out procedural requirements or substantive rules, or which ex-
plicitly delegate regulatory authority to localities or police agencies. Alt-
hough the primary focus here is state statutes, I would be remiss if I 
omitted the observation that federal law explicitly contemplates that po-
lice officers—as well as firefighters and correctional officers—may en-
gage in moonlighting. It does so by setting out that, for purposes of over-
time compensation, the hours that any state or local officer does “special 
detail work” by providing “law enforcement[] or related activities” to a 
“separate or independent employer” are not added to the hours the of-
ficer works for the primary employer.68 For the statute to apply, the of-
                                                                                                                                      
 64. IOWA CODE § 68B.2A(1)(a) (2016). 
 65. KY. RV. STAT. ANN. § 61.310(4) (West 2016). 
 66. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.112 (2016). The statute does not address officers who work for 
other state or local agencies. 
 67. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1712 (2016). 
 68. 29 U.S.C. § 207(p)(1) (2012).  
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ficer must choose to engage in the special detail and the agency must ei-
ther require the officer to be privately employed to work the special de-
tail, facilitate the officer’s private employment, or “otherwise affect[] the 
condition of employment . . . by a separate and independent employer.”69 
At the state level, the statutes that impose procedural regulations 
on the private employment of off-duty officers are directed primarily at 
creating a formal approval process. Some states require the head of a po-
lice agency to approve private, off-duty employment. Georgia requires 
the written approval of the head of the police agency (or a designee) that 
employs the officer.70 Washington allows officers to work as security 
guards only when approved to do so by the “chief law enforcement of-
ficer of the jurisdiction where the employment takes place,” which, in 
certain circumstances, could mean the approval of the head of an agency 
other than the one the officer works for.71 Other states require some su-
pervisory approval but do not limit it to the head of an agency. Iowa, for 
example, requires officers to obtain the approval of the agency but does 
not designate who in the agency must provide that approval.72 Similarly, 
California allows off-duty officers to work for private employers after be-
ing certified as qualified—a term it does not define—by the police agen-
cy and receiving “the approval of [the officer’s] agency supervisor,” but it 
does not identify what level of supervisor must approve the request.73 Yet 
other states require approval outside the police agency. Mississippi re-
quires deputies to have the approval of the county sheriff74 and municipal 
employees to get permission from the “governing authority of a munici-
pality”; in both contexts, state law directs the approving authority to con-
sider, in each individual case,75 whether private employment will bring 
disrepute or promote the public interest.76 
Some states require certain types of approval only for certain types 
of private employment. For officers working in a security capacity, Cali-
fornia requires the local political body—city council or county board of 
supervisors—to approve the “casual or part-time employment as a pri-
vate security guard or patrolman,”77 and the police agency must approve 
the officer’s use of its uniform and equipment.78 The agency’s approval is 
essential, as the law requires the officer to wear a police uniform while 
working in a security capacity.79 In South Carolina, off-duty officers may 
                                                                                                                                      
 69. Id. § 207(p)(1)(C). 
 70. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-3(c) (2016). 
 71. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020(3) (2016). 
 72. IOWA CODE § 68B.2A(1)(a) (2016). 
 73. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1127 (West 2016). 
 74. County sheriffs are, in many states, constitutional officers that are entirely separate from, 
and do not answer to, a county political authority such as a board of governors. Cf. Stoughton, Inci-
dental Regulation, supra note 56, at 2197 n.72. 
 75. Mississippi law requires that approval must be given individually, rather than established as 
blanket authorization. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(1). 
 76. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(1)–(2) (2016). 
 77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(1)(B) (West 2016). 
 78. Id. § 70(d)(1)(C). 
 79. Id. § 70(d)(1)(A). 
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wear their police uniforms, equipment, and weapons while working for a 
private employer if they receive the approval of both the agency and the 
“governing body” that employs them.80 Florida law imposes specific pro-
cedural requirements only in certain cases, requiring written approval of 
the agency or department head before officers can provide security ser-
vices to businesses licensed to sell alcoholic beverages.81 
In addition to ex ante approval, procedural regulations may require 
the officer or private employer to provide certain information to the po-
lice agency. In Mississippi and South Carolina, for example, individual 
officers who take private, off-duty jobs must provide their police agency 
advance notification of the place and type of employment as well as the 
hours to be worked.82 In other states, information may need to be provid-
ed to the private employer. In Washington, state patrol officers must 
provide written notice of the state’s liability rules to their private em-
ployer.83 
In addition to procedural requirements, some statutes establish sub-
stantive rules. Such statutes typically reflect legislative discomfort with 
the use of public authority on behalf of private employers in certain situ-
ations, such as labor disputes, or with regard to certain businesses, such 
as those that serve alcohol. Off-duty officers in California cannot “exer-
cise the powers of [a] police officer if employed by a private employer as 
a security guard during a strike, lockout, picketing, or other physical 
demonstration of a labor dispute at the site of the strike, lockout, picket-
ing, or other . . . demonstration.”84 Kentucky goes even further, prohibit-
ing officers from working, “directly or indirectly, in any labor dispute 
during [their] off-duty hours.”85 West Virginia law, similarly, states that 
officers shall not “engage in off-duty police work for any party engaged 
in or involved in [a] labor dispute or trouble between employer and em-
ployee.”86 Rhode Island takes an even broader approach by prohibiting 
municipalities and all agents, servants, and employees from accepting 
from any party to the labor dispute any compensation or reimbursement 
for any expense incurred in connection with a labor dispute.87 The law 
specifically identifies off-duty officers as municipal employees and explic-
itly prohibits “[p]rivate security guard services provided by off-duty po-
lice officers.”88 
With regard to businesses that sell alcohol, New York forbids offic-
ers from having any direct or indirect interest in the manufacture or sale 
of alcoholic beverages, permitting officers to work for private employers 
who sell alcohol only in severely limited circumstances: officers may 
                                                                                                                                      
 80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-24-10 (2016). 
 81. FLA. STAT. § 561.25(3) (2016). 
 82. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(4) (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-24-50. 
 83. See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(2). 
 85. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.310(4) (West 2016). 
 86. W. VA. CODE § 8-14-3 (2016). 
 87. 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-13.1(a) (2016). 
 88. Id. § 28-10-13.1(b). 
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“work in a premise licensed to sell beer at retail for off-premises con-
sumption . . . [or] work solely as a security guard or director of traffic on 
the premises of a volunteer firefighters’ organization licensed to sell beer 
and wine at retail pursuant to a temporary permit for on-premises con-
sumption.”89 According to the State Liquor Authority, this precludes of-
ficers not just from working for a business licensed to serve alcohol but 
also from working for a security company hired by such a business.90 
In addition to regulating the procedure or substance of private, off-
duty employment, state laws may also delegate regulatory authority. Cal-
ifornia law gives police agencies the authority to establish “reasonable 
rules and regulations” that officers must abide by while working for a 
private employer.91 Similarly, Virginia has a statute authorizing localities 
to regulate the private employment of off-duty officers by ordinance or, 
at the locality’s option, to “delegate the promulgation of . . . reasonable 
rules to the [police] chief . . . or sheriff.”92 
b. Indirect Regulation 
Not all state statutes regulate moonlighting by establishing proce-
dural or substantive rules for the practice itself. Some instead situate the 
private employment of off-duty officers into a broader legal context by 
allocating liability for officers’ actions or by distinguishing between 
moonlighting and the private security industry. 
Several states explicitly limit or allocate liability arising from the ac-
tions of off-duty officers who are working for private employers. Califor-
nia puts “any and all civil and criminal liability” arising from an off-duty 
officer’s actions, even those taken on behalf of a private employer, on the 
officer’s principal (public) employer.93 Mississippi takes the opposite 
tack, putting liability for an off-duty officer’s actions and omissions solely 
on the private employer and insulating the state and any political subdi-
visions from liability for any actions taken on behalf of the private em-
ployer.94 Further, Mississippi explicitly requires private employers to “ful-
ly indemnify” police agencies “for any expense or loss, including 
attorney’s fees, which results from any action taken against the jurisdic-
tion arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in discharge of pri-
vate security services while wearing the official uniform or using the offi-
cial weapon.”95 Washington has adopted a similar approach with regard 
to off-duty state patrol officers; the state specifically disclaims liability for 
conduct “that occurs while such officers are engaged in private law en-
                                                                                                                                      
 89. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 128-a (McKinney 2016).  
 90. Michel Lou & Matthew Spina, Molly’s Update: State Law Prohibits Cops from Working for 
Bars, BUFFALO NEWS (May 20, 2014), http://www.buffalonews.com/city-region/police-courts/mollys-
update-state-law-prohibits-cops-from-working-for-bars-20140520. 
 91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(1)(D) (West 2016). 
 92. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1712 (2016). 
 93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 70(d)(2). 
 94. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-11(3) (2016). 
 95. Id. 
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forcement off-duty employment.”96 State officers are required to provide 
written notification of that rule to private employers.97 
It is possible to take a less absolute approach. In a statute governing 
sheriffs’ offices, Florida apportions liability for an off-duty deputy’s ac-
tions to the private employer but sets out explicitly that, for workers’ 
compensation purposes, an injury that occurs while the off-duty deputy is 
“enforcing . . . criminal, traffic, or penal laws” is to be considered an on-
duty injury.98 It takes a broad view of what constitutes “on-duty,” defin-
ing it to include “providing security, patrol, or traffic direction for a pri-
vate . . . employer.”99 
Another approach is to make liability conditional. Alabama re-
quires private employers who hire off-duty officers that “perform any 
type of security work or to work while in the uniform of a peace officer” 
to maintain $100,000 in liability insurance to indemnify the officer for ac-
tions taken “within the line and scope of the private employment.”100 The 
failure to maintain insurance that indemnifies the officer renders “every 
individual employer, every general partner of a partnership employer, 
every member of an unincorporated association employer, and every of-
ficer of a corporate employer individually liable” for the off-duty of-
ficer’s actions.101 
Several states have statutes that seek to distinguish, in some way, 
the regulation of off-duty officers from the regulation of the private secu-
rity industry. Perhaps the most common form of statutory regulation 
touching on the private security industry is the exemption of public po-
lice officers from the licensure or regulatory requirements that apply to 
other security guards and private investigators—off-duty officers may 
work in a private security capacity without fulfilling the general require-
ments that a private security guard would have to satisfy. Texas, for ex-
ample, exempts from private security regulations any “person who has 
full-time employment as a peace officer and who receives compensation 
for private employment.”102 Arizona, similarly, allows people to “act or 
attempt to act or represent to that [they are] security guard[s]” only if 
they are either a registered security guard or “a regularly commissioned 
peace officer.”103 Washington takes a similar approach, exempting sworn 
officers who are “employed by any person to engage in off-duty em-
ployment as a private security guard” from the requirements otherwise 
imposed on security guards.104 Florida is similar, exempting off-duty dep-
                                                                                                                                      
 96. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.175(1) (2016). 
 97. Id. § 4.92.175(3) 
 98. FLA. STAT. § 30.2905(b)(2) (2016). 
 99. Id. 
 100. ALA. CODE § 6-5-338(c) (2016). 
 101. Id. 
 102. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.322(1) (West 2016). 
 103. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2608(A) (2016). 
 104. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.170.020 (2016). 
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uty sheriffs from the licensure requirements that otherwise apply to “per-
sons who watch or guard, patrol services, or private investigators.”105 
Driven perhaps by concerns about competition between private se-
curity agencies and public police providing private security services106 or 
by the potential problems of blurring the line between public police and 
the private security industry, some state statutes have attempted to draw 
a firm line between the two. In Tennessee, for example, an off-duty of-
ficer can work in a security capacity on behalf of a private employer, but 
if the private employer is a licensed, contract security company, the of-
ficer is prohibited from wearing a police uniform or identifying them-
selves as a police officer.107 Similarly, officers in North Carolina may not 
be licensed as private investigators or security guards,108 and, if an officer 
works for a “licensed security guard and patrol company,” the officer is 
prohibited from wearing her police uniform or using police equipment.109 
As in Tennessee, however, off-duty officers can provide similar services 
for other employers, and there is no prohibition on such officers wearing 
their police uniforms or using police equipment when they work for pri-
vate employers other than a licensed security guard and patrol compa-
ny.110 Some state laws authorize police officers to work in environments 
that are closed to the private security industry. In Connecticut, for exam-
ple, only sworn officers—current or retired—can provide armed security 
services in public schools.111 
B. Administrative Regulations 
Well over half the states lack any statutory regulation of moonlight-
ing, and the remainder have adopted statutes that, with few exceptions, 
provide little governance other than liability allocation or low-level pro-
cedural or substantive rules. Consequentially, the regulation of moon-
lighting is left primarily to law enforcement agencies themselves. 
Research into the administrative regulation of moonlighting is lim-
ited. Perhaps the broadest review was documented in six pages of the 
Hallcrest Report II published in 1990, which examined twenty-year 
trends in the private security industry and was published in 1990.112 That 
report described, in general terms, different aspects of agency-level regu-
lations. The report stated that agency policy often specified that off-duty 
officers had the full authority of on-duty officers, most agencies permit-
ted officers to wear their uniforms, and “many” permitted officers to use 
                                                                                                                                      
 105. FLA. STAT. § 30.2905(3) (2016). 
 106. See supra Part II.A. 
 107. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-35-127 (2016); Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen., No. 00-166, 2000 WL 1616931 
(Oct. 31, 2000). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-35-141(b)(2). 
 108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-21(a) (2016). 
 109. Id. § 74C-21(b). 
 110. Id. § 74C-21(c). 
 111. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-244a (2016). 
 112. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 286–87.  
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other equipment, “especially radios and police vehicles.”113 It also found 
that agencies typically inserted themselves between individual officers 
and private employers, keeping off-duty assignments and payments “in-
house,” and requiring liability waivers from both officers and private 
employers.114 The Hallcrest Report II also found that many agencies set a 
maximum number of hours—“generally 20 hours per week”—that offic-
ers could work for private employers.115 More recently, in August 2011, 
the Bureau of Governmental Research (“BGR”) released a report on 
proposed changes to the New Orleans Police Department’s moonlighting 
practices, which were based on problems identified during a Department 
of Justice investigation that ultimately resulted in a consent decree.116 For 
that report, the BGR reviewed model policies, actual policies at thirty 
agencies, and best practices.117 That report identified seven essential ele-
ments for strong policies to govern off-duty employment (the report re-
fers to moonlighting jobs as “details”): 
Centralized control and administration of all or most aspects of  
details[;] 
Appropriate limitations on the types of businesses that can hire  
officers for details[;] 
Eligibility requirements for officers seeking to work details[;] 
Limitations on work hours[;] 
A process for fairly assigning work and ensuring proper staffing  
of details[;] 
A fee policy that compensates officers on a standardized basis and 
cover[s] related departmental costs[; and] 
Monitoring and supervision of details.118 
In its 2007 survey of local police departments, the Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics (“BJS”) found that the vast majority of police departments had 
written policies governing off-duty employment, although the BJS did 
not offer any details about the content of those policies.119 
For this Article, the survey instrument I sent asked agencies wheth-
er they had written policies, procedures, directives, or guidelines for the 
private employment of off-duty officers. The vast majority of agencies 
                                                                                                                                      
 113. Id. at 285. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 286–87. 
 116. BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH, supra note 9.  
 117. Id. at 9–10. 
 118. Id. at 3.  
 119. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 
(2010),  https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf (finding 83% of all local police departments 
had off-duty employment policies, ranging from more than 98% of agencies serving populations of 
more than 10,000 to 68% of agencies serving populations of less than 2,500). The lack of details makes 
it difficult to determine whether the reported policies governed off-duty employment in a law en-
forcement capacity, which is the focus of this Article, or whether it also includes policies that govern 
employment unrelated to law enforcement.  
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(153, or 94.4%) indicated that they did, although six (3.7%) indicated 
that they did not, and three (1.9%) did not answer the question. Of the 
agencies with written policies, most (109, or 71.2%) had been modified in 
the last two years, while forty-two (27.5%) had not been, and two agen-
cies (1.3%) did not answer the question. Recent changes to the policies 
were generally modest, ranging from semantic changes and minor clarifi-
cations to introducing Internet-based resources for managing off-duty 
jobs. A few agencies expanded or restricted moonlighting or made 
changes to the maximum number of hours officers could work or the pay 
scale for off-duty employment. Only one agency, which is now under a 
consent decree, described a substantial overhaul of its off-duty employ-
ment policy, which was the result of a consent decree. 
The survey also asked whether agencies would provide their policies 
if requested.120 Of the 153 agencies with written policies, only 117 
(76.4%) stated that they would be willing to provide a copy. Twenty-
three agencies (15%) stated that they would not do so, and sixteen agen-
cies (10.5%) did not answer the question. A few agencies provided their 
policies at the time they sent in their survey responses. The remaining 
agencies that indicated they were willing to provide a copy of their 
moonlighting policies were later asked to do so. Relatively few respond-
ed. I received and reviewed policies from thirty-eight agencies (29.23% 
of the 130 agencies that permit moonlighting) that employ a total of 
36,848 full-time sworn officers, which are broken into size categories in 
Chart 9. 
CHART 9: AGENCIES PROVIDING OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT 
POLICIES 
 
I reviewed the provided policies and other documents121 with a spe-
cific eye to identifying requirements for and restrictions on moonlighting; 
the administration of private, off-duty jobs; the use of police uniforms, 
equipment, and vehicles while off duty; and officer remuneration. As 
with any policy analysis, review was complicated by the inconsistent use 
of terminology between agencies122 and the differing level of specificity in 
                                                                                                                                      
 120. I intentionally did not request a copy of the policy with the survey instrument, as I was con-
cerned that doing so might have had a chilling effect on agencies’ willingness to complete the survey 
itself. 
 121. For example, some agencies provided copies of the off-duty employment contracts that pri-
vate employers enter into or similar documentation. 
 122. What this Article calls “private, off-duty employment,” for example, agencies call “extra du-
ty,” “secondary employment,” “outside employment,” and a variety of other terms.  
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agency documentation.123 Further, it is important to keep in mind that 
agency policies can be complicated and overlapping: for example, an 
agency’s vehicle policy may regulate the off-duty use of vehicles, its leave 
policy may regulate moonlighting while on leave, and its off-duty em-
ployment policy may regulate both the off-duty use of vehicles and 
moonlighting while on leave. Obtaining a full understanding of how a 
particular agency regulates different aspects of moonlighting requires a 
comprehensive review of all applicable policies, but doing so was outside 
the scope of my research for this Article. Given those realities and the 
relatively small number of policies, this Section is more properly read as 
an illustration of different regulatory approaches than as a representative 
of industry norms. 
1. Requirements & Restrictions for Moonlighting 
Agency policies establish a variety of restrictions and requirements 
that officers, private employers, or both must meet before an officer is 
permitted to accept moonlighting work. Twenty-five of the thirty-eight 
policies (65.8%) regulate when in their careers officers can begin moon-
lighting, as, for example, by prohibiting off-duty officers from working 
for private employers during the police academy (fifteen policies), or 
field training (eleven policies), or a probationary period124 following field 
training (eight policies). Several policies were more nuanced, allowing 
officers to work off duty in some capacities but not others at certain 
points. One agency, for example, generally permits officers to engage in 
moonlighting once they have finished field training and are in a proba-
tionary period, but prohibits them from moonlighting for private busi-
nesses that serve alcohol. At that agency, only officers who have com-
pleted the probationary period can moonlight at private businesses that 
serves alcohol. Similarly, some agencies permit officers to accept posi-
tions as “courtesy officers”—receiving reduced rent at an apartment 
building or complex—during the probationary period. Other agencies 
prohibit it. Sometimes a policy is nuanced by exceptions, as with policies 
that generally prohibit probationary officers from accepting off-duty em-
ployment but allow it in the case of officers who have recently worked at 
another police agency. 
Officers who have fully completed training and a probationary peri-
od are not freed of all restrictions, of course. A few policies prohibit of-
ficers who have been assigned to specialized units, like vice or narcotics, 
from engaging in moonlighting. Twenty-seven policies (71.1%) address 
                                                                                                                                      
 123. Some policies were fairly comprehensive, while other policies were limited to a single page. 
Understanding several policies required going beyond the policy itself to other agency documentation.  
 124. The duration of the probationary period varies from agency to agency. The policies reviewed 
for this project suggest a range from six to eighteen months, but when exactly that clock starts can dif-
fer. Some agencies start the probationary clock after an officer completes basic recruit training (at a 
police academy) while others start the clock only when an officer is sworn in or completes field train-
ing. 
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officers who are on a limited, light, or restricted duty assignment.125 Most 
of the policies prohibit officers from moonlighting when they are on any-
thing other than regular duty, although a few allow for off-duty work if it 
is consistent with the restrictions that prevent the officer from working a 
regular-duty assignment. Nine policies (23.7%) require an officer to be in 
good standing or otherwise take into account an officer’s disciplinary 
record or present job performance. 
Another common, though hardly universal, aspect of off-duty em-
ployment policies addresses officers moonlighting while on leave. Twen-
ty-six policies (68.4%) prohibit or restrict an officer from moonlighting 
while they are on leave for medical reasons, and some policies prohibit 
officers from doing so within a certain amount of time (typically eight or 
twenty-four hours) of returning from sick leave. Twenty-three policies 
(60.1%) address disciplinary leave, prohibiting officers from working for 
private employers while they are suspended from regular duty. Other 
policies prohibit moonlighting while officers are on other types of leave, 
including bereavement leave, Family and Medical Leave Act leave, 
workers compensation leave, military leave, and so on. Interestingly, 
most of the policies explicitly or implicitly allow officers to engage in 
moonlighting while taking personal (vacation) leave or compensatory 
time.126 
Even when officers are allowed to engage in moonlighting, agency 
policy may regulate the schedule or number of hours an officer can work. 
Ten policies (26.3%) prohibit officers from moonlighting for a period of 
time immediately before (up to eight hours) or after (up to thirty 
minutes) their regular shift. Nineteen policies (50%) limit the total num-
ber of hours that officers can work, both on duty and off duty, in a specif-
ic period, although there is little consistency in what that total can be: 
maximums ranged from fourteen to eighteen hours in a day and from six-
ty-four to 112 hours in a week. Additionally, thirteen policies (34.2%) re-
strict the number of purely off-duty hours that an officer may work in a 
given period. Here, figures ranged from five to sixteen hours per day, 
from twenty to thirty-six hours per week, and from forty to seventy-two 
hours per month. The most detailed policy came from an agency with be-
tween twenty-five and fifty full-time officers; it limited moonlighting to 
no more than five hours on officers’ regular duty days, no more than sev-
en hours on the last work day of the week, and no more than twelve 
                                                                                                                                      
 125. As opposed to a “regular duty assignment,” which indicates that the officer is physically and 
psychologically capable of conducting the full range of police functions, a limited, light, or restricted 
duty assignment is typically used to accommodate medical or other limitations. For example, an officer 
who was injured may be placed on light duty until a doctor clears the individual to return to regular 
duty. 
 126. Compensatory time gives officers time off for working beyond their normal duty assignment 
in a given period. Thus, an officer who is regularly scheduled to work a forty-hour week on patrol, but 
who actually works fifty hours may take or be given ten hours of compensatory leave rather than pay 
(or fifty hours, at time-and-a-half, rather than overtime pay). At some agencies, officers can choose to 
take compensatory leave in lieu of pay. At other agencies, officers may be required to take one or the 
other in certain circumstances. 
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hours on officers’ days off. Policies that limit the total number of hours 
that officers can work function as a de facto “time off” requirement, but a 
few policies were more explicit, requiring officers to get adequate rest or 
specifying a minimum amount of rest time that officers must have be-
tween shifts. 
Officers may also be prohibited from working for certain types of 
employers or from engaging in certain types of work. Such policies seem 
to be motivated by some combination of the desire to avoid confusing 
the public nature of an officer’s law enforcement duties (as with policies 
that prohibit officers from working as bill collectors), the desire to main-
tain moral authority (as with policies that prohibit officers from working 
for sexually oriented businesses), and the desire to minimize or mitigate 
the risk of liability. The single most common restriction related to the 
type of employer involves businesses that serve alcohol: thirty-two of the 
thirty-eight policies (84.2%) prohibit or restrict moonlighting at such es-
tablishments. Restrictions range from prohibiting the officer from serv-
ing or selling alcohol, to requiring multiple officers, to prohibiting offic-
ers from physically working inside an establishment, limiting them to 
working at the entrance or in the parking lot. Other alcohol-related re-
strictions include limiting the nature of an off-duty officer’s role: several 
policies explicitly state that officers are only to fulfill law enforcement 
duties, not serve as bouncers or provide other services.  
As with alcohol-related businesses, officers may be prohibited from 
or restricted in working for: sexually oriented businesses (eighteen poli-
cies, 47.4%), tow-truck companies (sixteen policies, 42.1%), criminal en-
terprises or businesses owned by criminals (twelve policies, 31.6%), 
gambling establishments (nine policies, 23.7%), political employers 
(eight policies, 21.1%), public utility companies (two policies, or 5.3%), 
and racist organizations (two policies, or 5.3%). Additionally, sixteen 
policies (42.1%) prohibit or restrict officers from working for businesses 
in the midst of a strike or labor-management dispute. Notably, ten poli-
cies (26.3%) prohibit officers from working for private attorneys or re-
strict them from assisting with criminal defense work. 
Various policies also prohibit officers from working in certain ca-
pacities, regardless of the nature of the private employer. Twenty-eight 
policies (73.7%) prohibit or restrict officers from working as private in-
vestigators, bounty hunters, or officers in another jurisdiction, and four-
teen policies (36.8%) prohibit or restrict officers from working as body-
guards or bouncers. Twenty-four policies (63.4%) prohibit or restrict 
officers from working as bill collectors or bondsmen. Officers are also 
prohibited or restricted from working as repossession agents (seventeen 
policies, 44.7%); process servers (eleven policies, 28.9%); in jobs involv-
ing investigative techniques such as performing polygraphs, crash recon-
struction, or background checks (ten policies, 26.3%); and as couriers of 
cash or valuables (six policies, 16.7%). 
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Other restrictions on the type of private employer or nature of work 
include insurance companies, taxi companies, junk yards, businesses un-
der investigation, businesses that require officers to sign indemnity 
agreements, businesses that compete with private security firms, lock-
smiths, raves, dance halls, billiard parlors, and employers that the agency 
has put onto a blacklist. 
2. Off-Duty Employment Administration 
There was substantial variation in how law enforcement agencies 
administered private, off-duty employment programs and who in the 
agency had the authority to approve or decline a moonlighting request. 
Twenty agencies (52.6%) employ an in-house, off-duty employment co-
ordinator. The coordinators’ positions are split almost equally between a 
purely administrative role (with no authority to approve or disapprove 
requests) and a supervisory approach that includes evaluating and au-
thorizing moonlighting requests. Whether administrative or supervisory, 
internal coordinators appear to do little or no negotiation with the pri-
vate employer; they may review and implement an off-duty work sched-
ule, but they do not work with the private employer to create the sched-
ule. One policy took a different approach, allowing private employers to 
hire an officer as a coordinator—a coordinator for the specific private 
employer or job, rather than a coordinator for the police agency. As an 
external coordinator, that officer would work with the private employer 
to develop a schedule, negotiate pay rates, hire other officers for off-duty 
work, and so on. Such a coordinator may be paid an hourly rate by the 
private employer or receive a percentage of the total paid to other offic-
ers who work off-duty for that employer.127 
The survey solicited information about the lowest-ranking supervi-
sor who could approve a request for private, off-duty employment. 
Agencies largely fell into two categories: forty-eight agencies reported 
requiring the approval of either the agency head (thirty-four) or assistant 
or deputy agency head (fourteen), while thirty-nine agencies reported 
requiring the approval of a front-line supervisor such as a sergeant 
(twenty-six) or lieutenant (thirteen). Relatively few agencies required 
approval by a captain (three), major (four), colonel (two), or commander 
(seven).128 Thirteen agencies that reported permitting private, off-duty 
employment also reported that they did not require any supervisory ap-
proval. Four agencies that permit moonlighting did not respond to this 
question. Several agencies indicated that supervisory approval depended 
on the employee who would be working off-duty; officers required the 
approval of a front-line supervisor, while higher-ranked employees re-
                                                                                                                                      
 127. Brendan McCarthy, Biggest Earners in New Orleans Police Details are Often High-Ranking 
Officers Overseeing the Jobs, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 16, 2011, 6:08 AM), http://www.nola.com/ 
crime/index.ssf/2011/05/post_271.html. 
 128. Importantly, not all police agencies have all of those ranks, and some agencies may have dif-
ferent ranks that the survey did not account for. 
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quired higher-level approval. The survey also solicited information on 
the role of discretion in refusing moonlighting requests. Of the 130 agen-
cies that permit moonlighting, 105 (80.8%) indicated that supervisors re-
tained discretion to refuse moonlighting requests even if those requests 
complied with all written policy criteria. Seventeen agencies (13.1%) re-
quire supervisors to approve such requests, while eight agencies (6.2%) 
did not respond to that question. 
Of the thirty-eight agencies that provided policies for review, twen-
ty-three policies (60.5%) identified the lowest-ranking supervisor who 
can decline a moonlighting request. Although some policies explicitly 
state that only high-level commanders can refuse a request, most allow 
the immediate supervisor to do so. Separately, twenty-nine policies 
(76.3%) identified the highest-ranking supervisor who must approve 
such requests, with the vast majority requiring the approval of the agency 
head (police chief or sheriff). 
3. Uniforms, Equipment, and Vehicles 
Many agency policies governed, to some extent, what public equip-
ment an officer can wear or use while moonlighting. Twenty agencies 
(52.6%) require officers to wear their uniforms129 while working off duty 
for private employers, although nine policies allowed exceptions when 
authorized by a supervisor—exactly what level supervisor varied, from 
lieutenant to agency head, but no policies allowed sergeants to exempt 
officers from the uniform requirement. Five agencies (13.2%) had poli-
cies that permitted, but did not appear to require, officers to wear a uni-
form while moonlighting. Five agencies (13.2%) had policies that did not 
discuss uniforms. 
Similarly, twenty-one policies (55.3%) either require officers to car-
ry their issued weapons and other equipment with them while moonlight-
ing or permit them to do so with supervisory approval. As a general mat-
ter, officers are typically expected to carry their firearm and secondary 
weapons whenever they are in uniform. One policy specifically allows of-
ficers to use other agency equipment beyond what is personally issued to 
the officers—such as traffic cones or extra flashlights—so long as that 
equipment is not needed by an on-duty officer. None of the policies I re-
viewed discussed body-worn cameras (commonly referred to as “body 
cams”), although an analysis by the Associated Press found that only five 
of the twenty largest police agencies require uniformed officers to wear 
body cams while off-duty.130 Several agencies, on the other hand, specifi-
                                                                                                                                      
 129. A full review of what type of uniform agencies require, permit, or prohibit is outside the 
scope of this Article. One agency, for example, required officers to wear at least a “Class B” uniform 
while moonlighting. 
 130. Moonlighting Police Leave Body Cameras at Home, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 11, 2017, 
http://www.wctv.tv/content/news/Moonlighting-police-leave-body-cameras-at-home-427813483.html.  
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cally do not require moonlighting officers to wear body cams even when 
they do require on-duty officers to wear them.131 
There was slightly more variation with regard to officers’ use of po-
lice vehicles for private, off-duty employment. Eighteen policies (47.4%) 
allow officers to use a police vehicle while moonlighting, although some 
require special approval (eight policies, 21.1%) or impose a fee on the 
officer or the private employer (five policies, 13.2%). Four policies 
(10.5%) prohibit the use of police vehicles for moonlighting jobs. 
4. Officer Remuneration 
Of the thirty-eight agencies that provided documentation, a sub-
stantial majority (twenty-seven, or 71.1%) require the private employer 
to pay the officer directly. Two agencies prohibit direct cash payments, 
but allow direct payments by check or other means. One agency requires 
officers to report to the agency all compensation received. Ten agencies 
(26.3%) appear to require private employers to pay the agency itself, 
which then pays the officer. One agency allows private employers to ei-
ther pay the officer directly or to channel compensation through the 
agency. Six agencies that receive payments from private employers in-
clude in their policies an administrative fee; most of the policies do not 
identify exactly how much that fee is, but the ones that do range from 
two dollars per hour per officer to five dollars per hour per officer. At 
least one agency charges the officer an administrative fee—fifty dollars 
per month for use of an agency vehicle. 
There was similar variation in the way policies regulate the pay of-
ficers receive for private, off-duty employment. Seventeen policies 
(44.7%) do not mention pay scale at all. Fifteen agencies (39.5%) have 
either a fixed pay rate or a pay schedule that private employers must 
abide by. Five agencies (13.2%) set a minimum pay rate but allow for 
negotiation above that amount. The minimum pay rate may be scaled to 
a particular dollar amount (e.g., one agency set a twenty-five dollar min-
imum) or to some other referent (one agency set the minimum at the 
hourly rate of a rookie officer). Several agencies have policies that set a 
minimum number of hours for which officers must be paid, separate and 
apart from the minimum hourly pay. No agency policy establishes a ne-
gotiable pay scale with an hourly maximum. 
IV. MOONLIGHTING CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Where Part III discussed the statutory and administrative regimes 
that govern the private employment of off-duty officers, this Part ex-
plores the considerations that should underlie regulatory decision-
making. Specifically, I seek to identify the practical, legal, and conceptual 
concerns about the effects of moonlighting on the officers themselves, 
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the agencies they work for, and the communities they serve. Understand-
ing the potential effects of moonlighting is a necessary prerequisite to 
evaluating the way the practice is regulated and to developing industry 
best practices. 
A. Practical Considerations 
Moonlighting may affect the overall quality of police services by ei-
ther compensating for or contributing to low pay. Given limited munici-
pal and county budgets, pay scales that are often set by the terms of col-
lective-bargaining agreements, and benefits packages governed by 
collective bargaining or state law, police agencies may be unable to offer 
flexible, competitive salaries. By permitting moonlighting, such agencies 
may be able to attract applicants by offering the potential for a higher in-
come than the agency itself could provide. In such cases, private employ-
ers—or, more accurately, the possibility of private employment—may 
supplement what the agency itself provides, expanding the agency’s ap-
plicant pool by appealing to candidates with desirable educational or 
professional backgrounds who might otherwise be inclined to accept a 
higher paying position with a different agency or pursue an entirely dif-
ferent career field. In that way, agencies that permit moonlighting may 
improve the quality of police services by allowing them to hire more or 
better officers than they could otherwise afford. On the other hand, the 
potential for individual officers to supplement their income through pri-
vate employment might reduce the salary that police agencies must offer 
to attract candidates. In that way, moonlighting may drive wages down, 
perhaps decreasing the overall quality of police services. Low pay may 
create a gap that moonlighting can fill, but it may also be true that moon-
lighting contributes to low pay in the first place. 
Moonlighting may also affect officers’ actions and decision-making. 
Off-duty officers who are working for a private employer may interact 
with the public and take actions that deviate from the actions that an on-
duty officer might take in any given scenario. After all, officers are not 
drones that mindlessly carry out departmental priorities; they are affect-
ed by self-interest and are susceptible to conflict. Off-duty officers retain 
law enforcement powers, but they are working at the pleasure of a pri-
vate employer who, implicitly or explicitly, may prefer that off-duty of-
ficers exercise their discretion in a way that benefits the business’ inter-
ests without regard to the police mission. Off-duty officers may be more 
likely to ignore or merely disrupt suspicious activity that they would have 
investigated had they been on duty, and they may be less likely to engage 
in enforcement actions against a private business’ customers for low-level 
civil infractions and criminal offenses. For example, an off-duty officer 
working for a private employer might ignore parking or traffic violations 
or tell intoxicated nightclub patrons to leave for the evening rather than 
arresting them for disorderly conduct or public drunkenness. Officers 
may also find themselves enforcing private employers’ rules or exercising 
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discretion on behalf of a private employer in problematic ways, such as 
enforcing an employer’s dress code when that dress code is facially neu-
tral but has a clear racially discriminatory effect.132 
An officer’s on-duty behavior can also be shaped by off-duty em-
ployment. For example, an officer approaching the end of her shift may 
be reluctant to do anything that would delay her arrival at a moonlight-
ing job, especially when the employer provides an hourly rate of pay that 
exceeds the officer’s normal duty pay.133 Even when an officer is not an 
employee of a private venue, her on-duty behavior may be affected if her 
friends and coworkers are employed there, and even more so if the of-
ficer is interested in working there in the future. 
Whether on or off duty, an officer’s decisions and actions may be af-
fected by some conflict between the police agency’s interests, the private 
employer’s interests, and the officer’s own personal interests. That was 
certainly the perception of some police executives who participated in 
the Hallcrest Report II, which reflected their concerns about “the use or 
misuse of authority or police records for personal or financial gain, 
and . . . the provision of selected services that are normally part of an of-
ficer’s publicly paid responsibilities.”134 Police executives thought these 
concerns were exacerbated when officers contracted with private em-
ployers directly or through a police union and mitigated when private 
employers had to go through the agency to hire off-duty officers.135 Con-
cerns may also be exacerbated when a large portion of officers’ income is 
derived from private employment; in some cases, officers make more 
from moonlighting than they do from their public employment.136 Even 
when that is not the case, officers may change their behavior if private 
employment becomes particularly valuable. Consider that an officer’s re-
tirement is often an average of a certain number of their highest-earning 
years; an officer’s retirement benefits, for example, may be 3% (per year 
of service) of the three highest-paid years in the officer’s career. If pay 
for off-duty work is channeled through the agency, and if it counts as of-
ficer pay for retirement purposes,137 then officers near retirement (when 
they are already at the top of their pay range) may have a strong incen-
tive to inflate their highest-paid years by working a large number of 
hours for private employers. 
Beyond conscious decision-making, officer behavior can also be af-
fected by fatigue. According to research by the Police Foundation, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 132. See, e.g., Jessica Dickerson, Minneapolis Restaurant, ‘Bar Louie,’ Sparks Outrage with ‘Jim 
Crow’ Dress Code, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7, 2014, 4:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/07/07/bar-louie-racist-dress-code_n_5564530.html; Chris Gray et al., Getting Past the Bouncer, 
HOUS. PRESS (Feb. 9, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/getting-past-the-bouncer-
6587799. 
 133. Cf. LINN, supra note 16. 
 134. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 14, at 286. 
 135. Id. 
 136. McCarthy, supra note 127. 
 137. This survey did not inquire as to whether pay for private, off-duty employment was counted 
toward retirement. 
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length of an officer’s shift can affect judgment and behavior; shifts of 
eight and ten hours do not appear to have any negative affect, but shifts 
longer than ten hours do.138 Officers who engage in moonlighting either 
immediately before or immediately after their regular shifts are effective-
ly extending their working hours, quite possibly beyond the point at 
which fatigue begins to take some toll. Recall that of the thirty-eight pol-
icies that agencies provided, only half limited the number of hours that 
officers could work in a given period, and none of those had a limit of 
less than fourteen hours in a single day. An officer who works for a pri-
vate employer on one of their regular days off might not hit that thresh-
old, but that does not free officers from the potential threat of fatigue. 
Research on circadian rhythms and differential shift work suggests that 
fatigue may be a problem. For example, an officer who works a regular 
daytime shift is more likely to be affected by fatigue if they work an off-
duty night shift for a club that closes in the early morning, even if the of-
ficer’s on-duty and off-duty work are on different days.139 This may be 
why off-duty employment has been positively correlated with the likeli-
hood of an on-duty vehicle crash.140 Moonlighting is not the only source 
of fatigue, of course—an officer who played video games late into the 
previous night may be just as tired as an officer who was working at a 
bar—but agency-approved moonlighting represents an officially sanc-
tioned activity in a way that purely personal entertainment does not. 
Off-duty employment also has the potential to shape officers’ per-
ceptions in both positive and negative ways by reinforcing or moderating 
officers’ implicit biases. Officers, like everyone else, hold implicit biases 
that color, at an unconscious level, their interpretation of the world 
around them. Implicit biases may relate to race, ethnicity, age, apparent 
social status, religion, and a range of other characteristics. It is those im-
plicit biases that can lead officers to, for example, perceive a group of 
black teens as more suspicious than a group of white teens, think of His-
panic parties as more boisterous and wild than white parties, question a 
Muslim person’s motivations more closely than a Christian person’s, or 
find an affluent white woman’s account of events more credible than a 
working-class black man’s account. Psychological research strongly sug-
gests that implicit racial bias, occurring as it does at a completely uncon-
scious level, creates substantial challenges for modern policing.141 And 
                                                                                                                                      
 138. KAREN L. AMENDOLA ET AL., POLICE FOUND., THE SHIFT LENGTH EXPERIMENT: WHAT 
WE KNOW ABOUT 8-, 10-, AND 12-HOUR SHIFTS IN POLICING 37 (2011), http://www.policefoundation. 
org/publication/shift-length-experiment/. 
 139. See id. at 22–23. 
 140. Bryan Vila, Sleep Deprivation: What Does It Mean for Public Safety Officers? 262 NAT’L 
INST. JUST. J. 26, 28 (2009); Bryan Vila & Dennis Jay Kennedy, Tired Cops: The Prevalence and Poten-
tial Consequences of Police Fatigue, 248 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 16, 19 (2002); see also J. Andrew Hansen, 
Explaining Law Enforcement Officer-Involved Vehicle Collisions and Other Police Behavior (2015) 
(unpublished dissertation, University of South Carolina) (on file with author) (“It is . . . possible that 
second jobs are indicative of financial strain due to family illness, spousal unemployment, or some 
other stressful situation that may contribute to fatigue.”). 
 141. Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias and Law Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2011, at 44, 45, 
http://fairandimpartialpolicing.com/docs/thepolicechief.pdf. 
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moonlighting may play a role in creating or addressing those challenges. 
When an officer observes behavior that is consistent with an existing ste-
reotype—that, say, people of a certain ethnicity are loud and disruptive 
or are unable to consume alcohol responsibly—that observation can rein-
force the stereotype, strengthening the officer’s implicit bias. The impli-
cations are obvious, at least with regard to certain types of off-duty em-
ployment; officers who provide security at or outside of a nightclub on 
Latin Night or Hip-Hop Night might have their biases invisibly but 
meaningfully reinforced to the detriment of the officer’s future interac-
tions with community members. On the other hand, the literature sug-
gests that implicit biases may be tempered by exposure that challenges 
the stereotype.142 An officer who, for example, works security at a gro-
cery store in a black neighborhood may have a series of positive interac-
tions that reduces the potency of her racial biases. 
Finally, moonlighting also has the potential to negatively affect the 
balance of power within police agencies. When individual officers work 
as coordinators for private employers—selecting other officers to work 
off duty, creating schedules, distributing pay, et cetera—they also gain a 
disruptive measure of social capital within the police agency itself. For 
example, a review of the New Orleans Police Department (prior to its 
consent decree) found that off-duty jobs were, in some cases, “coordinat-
ed by lower-ranking officers who have their supervisors on the detail 
payroll.”143 Such an arrangement wreaks havoc in a hierarchical com-
mand structure; a supervisor cannot simultaneously manage an employee 
and rely on that employee for a job. 
B. Legal Considerations 
The law grants police officers special authority to, inter alia, detain, 
arrest, and use force. It imposes special requirements on the exercise of 
that authority, recognizing the need to balance the exercise of state pow-
er against individual interests. And it creates remedial mechanisms that 
attempt to strike a balance between limiting governmental overreach and 
chilling essential government actions. But do those laws apply with full 
force to off-duty officers? In this Section, I explore the legal issues raised 
by the private employment of off-duty officers. The threshold question, 
of course, is whether officers can exercise police powers while working 
off-duty. Current practice and the overwhelming weight of existing legal 
authority suggest that an officer is vested with authority by virtue of her 
position as an officer, not by virtue of her status as on or off duty.144 Of-
ficers can therefore exercise police authority regardless of whether they 
                                                                                                                                      
 142. Id. at 49. 
 143. McCarthy, supra note 127. 
 144. Sawyer v. Humphries, 570 A.2d 341, 345–47 (Md. App. Ct. 1990) (discussing decisions from 
New York, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Ohio, and Minnesota); SYDNEY H. 
ASCH, POLICE AUTHORITY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 35 (1968). 
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are working a normal shift or moonlighting.145 Other questions are less 
easily answered, and what answers exist are inconsistent and confusing. 
1. Reported Litigation 
The survey instrument queried whether agencies had been subject 
to litigation relating to private, off-duty employment. Twenty-one of the 
162 agencies (13%) reported that they had, 120 agencies (74.1%) indi-
cated that they had not, and twenty-one agencies (13%) did not answer 
the question. Agencies that indicated there had been litigation were 
asked to briefly describe it. Of those twenty-one agencies, six reported 
litigation related to the use of force by off-duty officers, including one 
shooting; four reported litigation related to vehicle crashes involving or 
allegedly caused by an off-duty officer; three reported litigation related 
to contractual disputes involving a private employer’s refusal to pay; one 
reported litigation involving an arrest; and one reported litigation involv-
ing an alleged failure to protect. The remaining agencies either provided 
no description or a nonresponsive answer. 
2. Officer Liability 
As public officials, police officers are subject to constitutional con-
straints, violations of which can expose them to civil liability under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against anyone who vio-
lates constitutional rights while acting under color of state law.146 The 
Court has adopted a broad reading of “under color of” state law, holding 
that, in the civil context as in the criminal context,147 it refers to the exer-
cise of authority “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”148 A 
public official, in other words, acts under color of law by acting under 
“pretense of law.”149 
To determine whether a police officer was clothed with the authori-
ty of state law at a particular time, courts have referred to a variety of ad 
hoc factors but have not developed a formalized test. This should not be 
surprising; the vast majority of § 1983 cases likely result from actions 
taken by on duty officers working their regular shifts or assignments, and 
thus the question of whether an officer was acting under color of law may 
                                                                                                                                      
 145. An officer’s authority may be limited by geographic jurisdiction, however. Stoughton, Inci-
dental Regulation, supra note 56, at 2198 (“State laws generally recognize the local nature of policing 
by restricting officers’ extraterritorial authority.”). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads, in relevant part:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.] 
 147. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). 
 148. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 
(1941)). 
 149. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 987 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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be taken for granted. But what about when an officer was off duty at the 
time? Whether an officer is on or off duty is a relevant factor,150 of 
course, but simply being off duty does not preclude an officer from us-
ing—or misusing—her authority.151 As a result, courts have had to sift 
through fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiries to deter-
mine whether officers, though off duty, were still clothed with the author-
ity of state law. Courts have framed the test in different ways. The “key 
determinant” for the First Circuit is “whether the actor . . . purposes to 
act in an official capacity or to exercise official responsibilities.”152 The 
Fifth Circuit looks to whether there was a sufficient “nexus between the 
victim, the improper conduct, and [the officer’s] performance of official 
duties.”153 The Seventh Circuit focuses on “whether [the officer’s] actions 
related in some way to the performance of a police duty.”154 Regardless 
of how exactly the test is framed, judicial inquiries generally focus on two 
loosely connected concepts: the apparent status of the officer as an of-
ficer and the nature of the officer’s actions.155 
Courts have indicated that an officer’s apparent status—specifically 
whether the officer looked like an officer at the time—is highly relevant 
to determining if the officer was acting under color of state law.156 Courts 
have recited a range of relevant factors, including whether the officer 
identified herself as an officer;157 whether other parties were aware of the 
officer’s official identity;158 whether the officer was in uniform159 or dis-
                                                                                                                                      
 150. Hechavarria v. San Francisco, 463 Fed. App’x 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2011); Greco v. Guss, 775 
F.2d 161, 168 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 151. See, e.g., Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Whether an officer 
is acting under color of state law does not depend on his on-or off-duty status at the time of the alleged 
violation.”); Pickrel v. Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Deciding whether a police of-
ficer acted under color of state law should turn largely on the nature of the specific acts the police of-
ficer performed, rather than on merely whether he was actively assigned at the moment to the perfor-
mance of police duties.”); Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994) (“More is required than a 
simple determination as to whether an officer was on or off duty when the challenged incident oc-
curred.”); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other 
grounds and remanded for reconsideration by City of Lawton, Okla. v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805 (1985); 
Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 
1975). 
 152. Martinez, 54 F.3d at 986. 
 153. Bustos, 599 F.3d at 464–65.  
 154. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1517 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 155. In perhaps the most concise and coherent judicial description of the two concepts, the First 
Circuit has stated: “Even though ‘acting under color of law’ includes ‘acting under pretense of law’ for 
purposes of a state action analysis, there can be no pretense if the challenged conduct is not related in 
some meaningful way either to the officer’s governmental status or to the performance of his duties.” 
Martinez, 54 F.3d at 987. 
 156. Claudio v. Sawyer, 409 Fed. App’x 464, 466 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 157. Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 496 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Wal-
lace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 (2007); Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 835 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); 
Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003); Rivera v. La Porte, 896 F.2d 691, 696 (2d Cir. 
1990); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980); Wahhab v. City of N.Y., 386 F. Supp. 2d 
277, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 158. Wahhab, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
 159. Hechavarria v. San Fransisco, 463 Fed. App’x 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2011); Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 
496, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 (2007); Pickrel v. Springfield, 45 F.3d 
1115, 1118 (7th Cir. 1995); Hanson v. Larkin, 605 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D. Minn. 1985) (holding that an 
officer was acting under color of law because he was in uniform at the time). 
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played a badge or official identification;160 whether the officer possessed 
or used police equipment such as a police vehicle,161 handcuffs,162 a fire-
arm,163 or other weaponry164 or equipment;165 and whether the actions un-
der review occurred on police property.166 
Courts have also indicated that the nature of the officer’s actions is 
a core consideration in determining whether she was acting under color 
of state law.167 Here, too, courts have described a variety of different fac-
tors, including whether the officer detained,168 arrested, ejected,169 or 
questioned someone; whether the officer was engaged in a “traditional 
public safety function”;170 and whether the officer’s “primary duty” at the 
time was to the public police agency or the private employer.171 Of par-
ticular relevance in the context of private, off-duty employment is the na-
ture of the private employment relationship and the way that relation-
ship shapes the officer’s actions. When a private employer hires a police 
officer explicitly “to intervene in cases requiring police action,”172 for ex-
ample, the officer’s actions may be more readily identifiable as taken un-
der color of state law.173 
The various factors that different courts have used and the weight 
that courts have put on those factors show little in the way of consistency. 
While some courts have held that a single factor—the fact that an officer 
                                                                                                                                      
 160. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 496, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 
(2007); Jocks, 316 F.3d at 134; Pickrel, 45 F.3d at 1118; Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 
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Pickrel, 45 F.3d at 1118; Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994); Rivera, 896 F.2d at 696 (re-
volver); Brandon, 516 F. Supp. at 1360, rev’d on other grounds by Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151 (6th. 
Cir. 1983). 
 164. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 496, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 
(2007); Wahhab v. New York, 386 F. Supp. 2d 277, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 165. Hechavarria, 463 Fed. App’x at 633; Haines v. Fisher, 82 F.3d 1503, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that officers who, as a practical joke, staged a fake robbery of a convenience store were not 
acting under color of law even though they used various pieces of police property). 
 166. Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a police chief was not 
acting under color of state law when he assaulted a family member at the police department). 
 167. Pickrel, 45 F.3d at 1118 (“Deciding whether a police officer acted under color of state law 
should turn largely on the nature of the specific acts the police officer performed.”). 
 168. Chapman, 319 F.3d at 835 (en banc). 
 169. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 495–96, abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 
(2007). 
 170. Wahhab v. New York, 386 F. Supp. 2d 277, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). This factor, of course, re-
quires identifying what exactly traditional public safety functions are. Again, there is no clear answer. 
For example, does working in a security and crowd-control capacity at a musical event constitute a 
traditional public safety function? At least one state appellate court has answered in the negative. See 
Pardon v. Finkel, 540 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
 171. Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 172. Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 496–97 (internal quotation marks omitted) (officer hired to work secu-
rity at a sporting event), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384 (2007). 
 173. Id. at 495–97; Traver, 627 F.2d at 938 (holding that off-duty officer working for a bank was 
acting under color of state law in part because he responded “as a police officer rather than as a bank 
employee”). 
STOUGHTON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2017 10:37 AM 
1888 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
was in uniform at the time174—was enough to establish that the officer 
was acting under color of state law, other courts have held that the same 
factor was all but irrelevant.175 Courts generally resist basing their deter-
mination on any single factor,176 but they are often confused about how 
much weight to give the many factors they recite. As a result, courts have 
sometimes emphasized the need to focus on the nature of the officer’s 
actions while at the same time discussing factors more closely related to 
an officer’s appearance than the nature of their actions.177 Further, there 
is often tension within and between different factors. At the same time 
that some courts have held the exercise of traditional police authority, 
such as detaining or arresting a suspected criminal, supports the conclu-
sion that an off-duty officer is clothed with the authority of state law, 
other courts have held that “the performance of private security func-
tions [that] may entail the investigation of a crime does not transform the 
actions of a private security officer into state action,” even when the pri-
vate security officer is an uniformed, off-duty police officer.178 
The characterization of an officer—as a public official, private em-
ployee, both, or neither—determines not only whether the officer is po-
tentially subject to constitutional tort litigation under § 1983, but also 
what defenses the officer can use to defend themselves against state or 
constitutional tort claims. 
Statutory law that waives sovereign immunity from tort liability 
generally withholds that waiver—thus preserving immunity—in various 
contexts applicable to police actions.179 One of the primary exceptions to 
the waiver of immunity involves the exercise of discretion by government 
agents in the course of their official duties.180 Such an exception exists in 
the Federal Torts Claims Act, which exempts from the waiver of sover-
eign immunity “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . 
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”181 State law often es-
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separation-of-powers concerns that underlie immunity for discretionary actions). 
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tablishes an analog,182 and “[a] majority of courts . . . apply the ‘discre-
tionary function’ test when considering the duties of state and local gov-
ernmental entities.”183 In the private, off-duty employment context, an 
officer may be shielded from liability for harms relating to discretionary 
decisions to detain, to arrest, to investigate, or to use force, but only if 
such a decision was an exercise of official power. If the decision to detain 
or arrest was an exercise of private power—the type exercised by citizens 
or merchants and their employees—then governmental immunity does 
not apply. The Michigan Court of Appeals, for example, held that gov-
ernmental immunity did not apply to off-duty deputies who were sued—
for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and 
battery, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress—following an 
altercation at a musical venue for which they were providing security.184 
Relying on the police agency’s contract with the concert promoter, in 
which the promoter agreed to pay the county a set hourly rate for each 
off-duty deputy, the court held that the deputies were engaged in “a pri-
vate security guard situation, . . . a nongovernmental function, thereby 
precluding the [official] immunity defense.”185 
In addition to official immunity, off-duty officers benefit from 
common-law defenses when acting in their official capacity. The exist-
ence of probable cause, for example, is a complete defense that officers 
can raise against claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution.186 In some states, any employee of a private merchant may 
receive similar protection under a “shopkeeper’s privilege” law, render-
ing inconsequential the question of whether an off-duty officer was act-
ing as an officer or as a merchant’s employee. In states that provide more 
protection to officers than private employees, however, the distinction 
can be critical. 
As critical as it is, however, the results of the distinction may not be 
theoretically sound. When an officer takes action that is functionally 
identical to the actions that are—or would have been—taken by a private 
employee or security guard, it is not clear whether anything other than 
pure formalism justifies exposing the officer to additional liability under 
§ 1983 or providing additional protections under various police-specific 
defenses. Consider, for example, qualified immunity, “the most im-
portant doctrine in the law of constitutional torts.”187 Qualified immunity 
insulates public officials, including police officers, from constitutional 
tort suits unless it was clear at the time that their actions violated an es-
                                                                                                                                      
 182. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §50-21-24(2) (2016); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265(3)(c) (2016); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (2016). 
 183. W. Jonathan Cardi, The Role of Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1129, 1155 (2014) (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 270, at 720–21 
(2000)). 
 184. Pardon v. Finkel, 540 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 
860 (2010).  
 187. Id. at 852. 
STOUGHTON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2017 10:37 AM 
1890 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
tablished constitutional right.188 That is to say, if a reasonable officer 
could have believed that the actions in question were lawful, qualified 
immunity shields the officer not just from damages, but from suit.189 Such 
protection is necessary, the Court has said, to avoid the many costs of 
frivolous claims, such as 
the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from 
pressing public issues, . . . the deterrence of able bodied citizens 
from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that 
fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the more reso-
lute, or more irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties.190 
When an officer’s actions, taken on duty and solely on behalf of the pub-
lic, give rise to a § 1983 claim, the justifications for qualified immunity’s 
expansive protections are at least arguably appropriate. But when an off-
duty officer acts on behalf of a private employer, the defense is less teth-
ered to its rationales. The officer will face the expenses of litigation and 
the diversion of their attention from official duties, but that would be 
true in a real estate dispute or any other private suit completely unrelat-
ed to the officer’s public authority, from a real estate suit to divorce liti-
gation.191 As for deterrence, while the courts are appropriately cautious 
about the risk of driving people away from public employment or chilling 
public employees in the exercise of their duties, the same need for re-
straint is not self-evident in the context of the private employment of off-
duty officers. Applying qualified immunity in the context of moonlight-
ing suggests that the unflinching discharge of an officer’s duties neces-
sarily involves working for a private employer. Indeed, there may be rea-
sons to encourage police officers to weigh carefully the potential risks of 
accepting off-duty work or to dampen their ardor for using public au-
thority on behalf of private employers. 
3. Municipal Liability 
Though the Court has rejected respondeat superior in the context of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipalities may be liable for constitutional depriva-
tions that result from an official custom or policy.192 For example, a city 
may be liable when its police agency fails to train or supervise its officers 
when the lack of training or supervision “amounts to deliberate indiffer-
ence to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”193 
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But identifying the requisite level of supervision or training in the moon-
lighting context may prove difficult. During their regular-duty assign-
ments, officers work within a chain of command with clearly delineated 
authority: every sergeant, lieutenant, and captain knows whom they are 
responsible for and when. Officers may be pulled out of their regular du-
ties and given a special assignment, but there, too, the supervisory hier-
archy is quite clear: officers are temporarily under the supervision of a 
different part of the chain of command. Who, then, supervises the off-
duty officer? Perhaps there is a centralized supervisor who exercises con-
trol over all of the agency’s off-duty officers at a given time, or perhaps 
off-duty officers report to whichever supervisors are on-duty and respon-
sible for the jurisdiction where the private employer is working, or per-
haps off-duty officers are under the authority of their regular supervisor 
(who is, of course, not working at the time). More troublingly, if likely 
more frequently, perhaps officers turn paperwork into police supervisors, 
but they report to and work under the day-to-day direction of a private 
employer. 
Similar questions arise in the context of failure-to-train claims. Of-
ficers undoubtedly use their police training on behalf of private employ-
ers, but the question is whether officers go beyond that training and, if 
so, whether the municipalities have an obligation to provide additional 
training. For example, officers may commonly deal with noise com-
plaints, but an officer who, while off duty, handles such complaints at a 
local apartment complex in exchange for reduced rent—a so-called 
“courtesy officer”—is far more likely to deal with landlord/tenant dis-
putes, code violations, nuisance abatement issues, and the like. Similarly, 
officers who moonlight for retail businesses are more likely than their 
on-duty colleagues to deal with labor and employment issues. Failing to 
provide officers with guidance on such issues may arguably amount to 
deliberate indifference to civilians’ rights. Additionally, the extent to 
which municipalities and police agencies can rely on a private employer 
to provide relevant training remains an unanswered question. 
What evidence might tend to establish or disprove an alleged failure 
to train or supervise off-duty officers? In litigation that reached the Sev-
enth Circuit, one plaintiff argued that a city’s indemnification agreement 
with the private employer—under which the private employer was liable 
for any judgments against the city—established that the city was aware 
that off-duty officers engage in constitutional violations.194 Though the 
argument was unsuccessful in that case, it illustrates how policies and 
procedures that regulate moonlighting may be central to the issue of lia-
bility. 
State law further complicates the picture. Under state tort law, a po-
lice agency’s vicarious liability depends on whether the officer was acting 
within the scope of her employment. As with the “under color of law” 
inquiry, a range of factors may be considered, and courts may well weigh 
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those factors very differently. An appellate court in Louisiana, for exam-
ple, held that merely wearing a police uniform not only fails to establish 
that the officer was acting within the course and scope of their employ-
ment, it does not even create a genuine issue of material fact on that 
question.195 
4. Private Employer Liability 
Private parties can be liable for constitutional violations under § 
1983, though they must be acting as a government agent for such liability 
to attach. In the context of private businesses employing off-duty offic-
ers, the Fifth Circuit has held that a private employer acts under color of 
state law when they have formed a pre-arranged or customary plan with 
the police. In Smith v. Brookshire Brothers, the Fifth Circuit found that 
the Lufkin, Texas Police Department had a practice of arresting or eject-
ing individuals at the request of retail store employees without “inde-
pendently establishing that there was probable cause . . . without a valid 
complaint having been filed and without knowing the facts to believe 
that a crime had been committed.”196 This practice, the court held, was 
sufficient to establish that the retail store was acting under color of law 
for purposes of § 1983 liability.197 Different courts have articulated similar 
concepts, though in different contexts. The Seventh Circuit has held that 
a private party acts under color of law by conspiring with a public official 
to effect a constitutional deprivation,198 while the Tenth Circuit has held a 
police officer’s delegation to a private actor of the duty to independently 
investigate and make an independent probable-cause determination is 
sufficient to establish that the private party was acting under color of 
law.199 In the context of off-duty employment, a police agency’s policies 
and procedures—particularly those that give the private employer some 
form of supervisory authority over officers—may advance the argument 
that the private employer was a state actor. 
More common than § 1983 liability, however, is the potential for a 
private employer to be subject to respondeat superior liability for the tor-
tious actions of its employees. As a matter of blackletter law, employers 
are not vicariously liable for actions committed by an independent con-
tractor, and there is a substantial literature on making that distinction. I 
raise it here only to note that the finding that an officer is acting under 
color of law does not necessarily rule out the finding that the officer was 
also an employee of a private business. Under the “dual master doc-
trine,” an officer’s off-duty work might establish them as an employee of 
both the government and the private employer. In White v. Revco Dis-
count Drug Centers, Inc., for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
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held that a government agency could be held liable for the actions of an 
officer who was off duty and privately employed at the time if the of-
ficer’s actions involved the exercise of a traditional police power, the 
municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the officer’s ac-
tions, the officer’s actions served the interests of both the private em-
ployer and the municipality, and the interests of the private employer 
and the municipality were not inconsistent with each other.200 
5. Criminal Liability 
Civil liability, of course, is only part of the puzzle. There is also the 
potential of criminal liability—which may be imposed on civilians who 
interact with the off-duty officer—to consider. Crimes, particularly vio-
lent crimes, are punished more severely when they are committed against 
officers. Does that include off-duty officers? If a nightclub patron shoves 
an off-duty officer who is working for the club at the time, or if an 
apartment complex visitor runs away from the courtesy officer, can the 
civilian be arrested for, charged with, and convicted of battery on a law 
enforcement officer or resisting a law enforcement officer? Here, as with 
the “under color of law” question under § 1983, the distinction between 
public officer and private employee is critical. 
In 1979, the California Supreme Court held that, in the context of 
an off-duty officer working for a private employer, “the fact of private 
employment . . . operates to prevent a police officer from acting in what 
would otherwise be his official capacity.”201 Because the officer was not 
acting in an official capacity, he could not be the victim of crime predi-
cated on that official identity, such as battery of an officer. The Califor-
nia legislature rejected the state supreme court’s decision, legislating that 
the battery of an officer was an aggravated offense regardless of whether 
the officer was on or off duty or working in a private capacity.202 
Other states have adopted a more nuanced approach. A decision 
from the North Carolina Supreme Court, for example, held that, in the 
context of capital-punishment aggravating circumstances, “a police of-
ficer retains his official law enforcement officer status even while ‘off du-
ty’ unless it is clear from the nature of his activities that he is acting solely 
on behalf of a private entity, or is engaged in some frolic or private busi-
ness of his own.”203 Shortly thereafter, a state appellate court applied that 
holding to a defendant who had struck two off-duty officers while they 
were working, in uniform, for a fast-food restaurant. As the court ex-
plained: 
[The officers] were working in full police uniform and were carrying 
sidearms. [T]he officers’ [off-duty] employment had been arranged 
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through the Charlotte Police Department and the officers were re-
quired to follow Department mandated rules and guidelines. Fur-
thermore, at the time they were assaulted, Officers Henry and Fer-
guson were attempting to place defendant under arrest. Making 
arrests is one of the official duties of law-enforcement officers. 
It is not clear whether it was the appearance of the officers, their actions, 
or both that were the operative facts, but the court upheld the conviction 
under a statute that provided it was a misdemeanor to “[a]ssault[] a law-
enforcement officer, . . . while the officer . . . is discharging or attempting 
to discharge a duty of his office.”204 
C. Conceptual Considerations 
Beyond the practical and legal concerns are the conceptual concerns 
to which moonlighting gives rise. One such concern is the role and func-
tion law enforcement agencies fulfill. Traditionally, police agencies are 
thought to prioritize public service; maintenance of order; and the pre-
vention, investigation, and resolution of criminal behavior, each of which 
advances a clear community interest. As recent attention to civil asset 
forfeiture and the Department of Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police 
Department make clear, police agencies sometimes engage in an addi-
tional function—revenue generation. The private employment of officers 
can be used to increase officer income, generate agency revenue, or 
both.205 Indeed, reviewing the answers to the survey instrument, one sees 
that supplementing officer income was the third most popular justifica-
tion that agencies offered for permitting private employers to hire off-
duty officers.206 Although it was outside the scope of this research, the 
Hallcrest Report II’s survey of security industry professionals found that 
“20% of [private] security managers reported receiving ‘informal bids’ 
from law enforcement agencies and about 30% from individual police of-
ficers.”207 Instead of overseeing officers as they respond to calls for ser-
vice or proactively seeking to improve quality of life in the communities 
they serve, such an approach threatens to recast police agencies as hiring 
halls, challenging the view of police organizations as exclusively or pri-
marily public-service agencies. 
Further, police agencies that permit or encourage moonlighting may 
put themselves in a position of choosing, or at least affecting the selec-
tion of, winners and losers in the private commercial sector. Of the agen-
cies that permit moonlighting, supervisors at 105 of the 130 agencies 
(80.8%) retain discretion to refuse moonlighting requests even if those 
requests comply with all written policy criteria. There is, of course, the 
potential for discretion to be exercised for a range of inappropriate rea-
sons. There is also, however, the potential for the exercise of discretion 
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to have far-reaching effects. Consider two nightclubs, identical except for 
a police executive’s decision to allow off-duty officers to work at one, but 
not the other. As a result, off-duty officers handle most of the incidents 
at one club, but problems at the second require an on-duty officer to be 
dispatched, meaning that a dispatch record is maintained and more re-
ports and arrests are generated. Over the course of a year or more, the 
first night club maintains a stellar record with few, if any, formally rec-
orded problems, but the second night club develops a lengthy paper trail 
documenting numerous incidents and problems. That documentation, or 
lack thereof, can affect zoning and licensing decisions at the state and lo-
cal level, such as the renewal of an alcohol sales license. Crime bulletins 
carried in the local newspaper can affect a business’ reputation. That, in 
turn, can affect its patronage, raising the specter of a negative feedback 
loop that could result in increasing problems—a venue that becomes 
known for trouble attracts troublemakers. If this seems far-fetched, con-
sider that one large agency (with well over 1,000 officers) that reported 
litigation related to the private employment of off-duty officers indicated 
that it stopped providing officers when a private employer did not pay 
for services. The agency’s explanation continued, “[p]rivate employer 
lost liquor lic[ense] because of lack of off-duty employment.” Admitted-
ly, of course, my more expansive example is a hypothetical; I use it to il-
lustrate how police agencies’ discretionary decisions about private, off-
duty employment can inadvertently and invisibly change the role they 
play in the community. 
Moonlighting also raises conceptual concerns about democratic le-
gitimacy with regard to the role of the police in the community. Unlike 
most other government agents and all private employees, uniformed po-
lice officers are representatives “not just for their respective agencies, but 
for government, law, and justice more generally.”208 As one police chief 
writes, “the public sees the police as community leaders and community 
ambassadors.”209 The presence of those uniformed community leaders 
and ambassadors at a private business can send a very different message 
than the presence of a security guard or un-uniformed employee, sug-
gesting a level of official involvement or endorsement that reflects not 
just on the private employer, but on the police agency and local govern-
ment. On the one hand, moonlighting may bring community members 
greater exposure to and interaction with officers, who would not other-
wise be working at a grocery store or nightclub or living at a particular 
apartment complex. On the other hand, that exposure may be problem-
atic. When a police officer is standing outside of a night club on a Satur-
day night or stopping traffic so vehicles can leave a church parking on 
Sunday morning, their presence and actions go far beyond any purely 
private equivalent. Such problems may occur if, for example, club-goers 
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perceive the presence of officers on Latin Night or Hip-Hop Night as an 
indication of government or community distrust, or if motorists perceive 
an agency as favoring church-related traffic over other drivers. Recall 
that the single most common justification for permitting off-duty officers 
to work for private employers, offered by forty agencies (30.76% of per-
missive agencies), was the perceived benefit to community relations. 
That justification may be called into question if moonlighting hurts 
community relations, or if the benefits are felt primarily or exclusively in 
the segments of the community that already have strong ties with the po-
lice at the cost of other aspects of the community. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Moonlighting is a common feature of modern police practices, but 
one that relatively little is known about. Survey responses from the 162 
participating agencies, which collectively employ just under a fifth of all 
state and local officers in the United States, reflect that 80% of agencies 
permit uniformed officers to work while off duty and suggest that moon-
lighting may be far more common than previously appreciated. Yet the 
reasons for permitting or prohibiting moonlighting vary widely, as do the 
state statutes and agency policies that regulate the practice, suggesting a 
significant need for future work. 
The private employment of off-duty officers may expand existing 
discussions about policing or raise new issues worthy of consideration. 
Consider, for example, that almost a quarter of the agencies that permit 
moonlighting indicated that they do so in part because the private pay 
supplements officer income. Descriptively, that is undoubtedly true, but 
it raises a series of additional descriptive and normative questions: are 
agencies advertising off-duty employment as a benefit to potential re-
cruits? Is that appropriate? If so, would doing so affect recruitment ef-
forts? Separate and apart from recruitment, how many agencies receive 
pay for private, off-duty employment and channel it to the officer? To 
what extent, if any, should that private pay affect the calculation of an of-
ficer’s retirement benefits? 
Further, many of the justifications for prohibiting or permitting off-
duty employment are open to empirical analysis. A quarter of the agen-
cies that permit moonlighting indicated that they do so in part because it 
improves agency staffing: off-duty officers can respond to events that 
would otherwise require an on-duty officer to respond. Future research 
might examine whether private, off-duty employment has a consistent 
effect on calls for service or the distribution of on-duty resources. Moon-
lighting might well drive down the demand for on-duty resources, but the 
picture may be more complicated. Consider two possibilities. First, if off-
duty officers call for back-up in situations where no officer would be in-
volved without moonlighting, that may increase the demand on on-duty 
resources. Second, if off-duty officers make discretionary arrests and 
must attend subsequent court proceedings on their days off, they are 
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compensated for their time (often at an overtime rate) by the police 
agency, not the private employer for whom they were working at the 
time of the arrest. When that is the case, the agency may be paying for an 
off-duty officer’s actions, reducing the staffing benefit to the agency. Fu-
ture research could quantify many other justifications for or against 
moonlighting, from the effect on police/community relations and public 
safety to the risk of litigation and liability. 
Deeper attention to moonlighting may also encourage an appropri-
ately interdisciplinary approach to police research. There is clearly ample 
room for legal scholars to address some of the questions raised by pri-
vate, off-duty employment, but understanding policing also requires the 
attention of criminologists, social and cognitive psychologists, political 
scientists, and scholars from other disciplines, who can apply a variety of 
methodologies to study how moonlighting affects officers, civilians, po-
lice agencies, private businesses, communities, the criminal justice sys-
tem, the legal system, and so on. 
More attention to the private employment of off-duty officers is also 
needed to develop a set of evidence-based best practices. The empirical 
research suggested above could provide a more informed body of 
knowledge that agencies and police executives could draw on when de-
ciding whether to allow and how to regulate moonlighting. Even without 
new research, police executives and scholars can apply existing work to 
questions about the regulation of moonlighting. The research on shift 
work and fatigue, for example, suggests that agencies that permit officers 
to work eighteen hours in a day or 112 hours in a week may be increasing 
the potential for poor decision making, putting officers and civilians at 
risk, and increasing the locality’s exposure to liability. Not all questions 
may have easily quantifiable answers, of course, but additional study and 
attention in this area is critical to the development of best practices for 
this long-standing and important aspect of modern policing. 
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APPENDIX A: OFF-DUTY EMPLOYMENT SURVEY 
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